Abstract
In this paper I articulate a view of doxastic control that helps defend the legitimacy of our practice of blaming people for their beliefs. I distinguish between three types of doxastic control: intention-based, reason-based, and influence-based. First I argue that, although we lack direct intention-based control over our beliefs, such control is not necessary for legitimate doxastic blame. Second, I suggest that we distinguish two types of reason-responsiveness: sensitivity to reasons and appreciation of reasons. I argue that while both capacities are necessary for satisfying the control condition, neither is sufficient. Finally, I defend an influence-based view of doxastic control according to which we have the capacity to execute intentions to engage in reflection that causally influences our beliefs in positive epistemic ways. This capacity is both necessary and sufficient for satisfying the control condition for legitimate doxastic blame. I end by defending the view from two objections: that reflection is not necessary for meeting the control condition, and that it is not sufficient.
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Notes
The difference can be put in terms of reasons: while we can act for any reason that counts in favor of acting, it is not the case that we can believe for any reason that counts in favor of believing. See, for example, Hieronymi (2006, pp. 45–46).
See Woudenberg (2009) for a good discussion of just how revisionary it would be to conclude that doxastic blame is illegitimate.
I argue against the view that we have such intention-based doxastic control in Sect. 3.
See also Wolf’s discussion of what she calls the “condition of freedom” and the “condition of value,” both of which must be met in order for a person to be morally responsible for her action (1980, p. 151).
Note that if Feldman (2000, 2001) is right when he claims that agents can still be subject to role obligations even if they lack control over their beliefs, then conceiving of epistemic justification in terms of role obligations is a live option. The stronger versions of deontological justification—conceived of in terms of responsibility and blame—are the ones that I reject, along with Alston.
Consider Clifford’s (1999, pp. 70–71) infamous case of doxastic blame in which a shipowner who falsely believes his ship is safe sends it out to sea, resulting in many deaths. Some have argued that this does not show that we blame people for their beliefs because the case is better understood in terms of blaming the shipowner for the actions caused by his belief. However, while we often do blame people for the actions resulting from their beliefs, we also sometimes blame them for their beliefs, as the cases above illustrate.
Peels (2013, pp. 8–9) offers a similar argument against Feldman’s claim that agents can be subject to doxastic obligations even if they lack control.
Of course, people do have control over whether they occupy the role of believer insofar as they have control over whether they are alive. But this is a form of control people have over almost everything, and as such is not very interesting.
Note that it may well be that being subject to epistemic obligation does not require that one has control. But being legitimately blamed for violating an epistemic obligation (or for failing to realize various epistemic values) does require that an agent has some form of control.
See Alston (1988, pp. 263–277).
Sometimes believing directly as a result of an intention is referred to as “believing at will” or “deciding to believe”. However, there is no agreed upon definition of these locutions, so I think it can be misleading to use them without specifying the phenomenon one has in mind.
Alston (1988, p. 263).
Alston (1988, pp. 264–268).
See Smith (2005) for additional interesting examples of things for which we hold people responsible, but over which we lack direct intention-based control (which Smith calls “direct volitional control”).
Supporters of various versions of the Reason-Responsiveness View include Ryan (2003) and Steup (2008, 2011, 2012), both of whom label their views “doxastic compatibilism.” See also Hieronymi (2006) and (2008, pp. 362–363), as well as Smith (2000, pp. 40–46) and (2005, pp. 236–271), who take their inspiration from Scanlon (1998) and Korsgaard (1996). Additional supporters include Shah (2002, p. 443) and Weatherson (2008, p. 546).
I borrow here from Kornblith’s discussion in (2012, pp. 50–53).
Burge (1996, pp. 98–101).
My thinking about reason-responsiveness with respect to believing has been greatly influenced by Peels (2013), in which he argues against six different versions of the view that agents can legitimately be subject to doxastic obligations even though they lack voluntary control over their beliefs. The conclusion that Peels draws is that we should endorse the view that we have some form of indirect intention-based control over our beliefs. I agree, but, as it will become clear, I go further in arguing that this control must take the specific form of reflection.
Note that some children genuinely believe these things and aren’t merely engaging in a form of pretense, even when no one tells them that they’re true, and even when they don’t watch movies or read books that would plant them in their heads.
See Peels (2013, pp. 15–16) for an additional argument that such influence is required for agents to be held responsible for their beliefs.
See Kornblith (1989) for more examples.
See the studies reported by DeWall et al. (2008).
For one such study, see Gagne and Smith (1962).
See Small et al. (2007).
See Westling et al. (2006).
Olson (2015) nicely outlines many of them.
In keeping with Burge (1996), I hold that reflection is necessary for agents to be able to recognize their reasons as such. While much can be said about the relationship between reflection and recognition of reasons, in brief, here’s how I’m thinking of it: The reasons that an agent has depend on that agent’s mental states. So in order to recognize one’s reasons, one must be able to recognize one’s mental states, which is something an agent can only do via reflection. An agent might learn of her own mental states in some other way—by testimony, for example. But learning via testimony, at best, produces a belief that falls short of recognition. Recognizing one’s reason as a reason does not amount to merely believing that one’s reason is a reason. It involves a kind of understanding of one’s own mental states which is something one cannot do apart from reflection. Thanks to Declan Smithies for helpful discussion and to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify this.
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Acknowledgements
I presented earlier versions of this paper at the 2014 Pacific APA and the 2015 Alabama Philosophical Society; thanks to those in attendance for their questions and objections. Thanks to Ryan Bond, Blake McAllister, Caroline Paddock, Hope Sample, and Keren Wilson for productive exchanges about the ideas here; and thanks to Matt Frise, Allan Hazlett, Dan Howard-Snyder, Daniel Immerman. Abe Roth, Meg Schmitt, Tim Schroeder, and two anonymous referees for detailed comments. Special thanks to Bradley Rettler for several helpful discussions and to Declan Smithies for many invaluable conversations and extensive comments on multiple drafts.
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Rettler, L. In defense of doxastic blame. Synthese 195, 2205–2226 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1332-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1332-0