, Volume 194, Issue 7, pp 2557–2580 | Cite as

Moderately naturalistic metaphysics

  • Matteo Morganti
  • Tuomas E. Tahko


The present paper discusses different approaches to metaphysics and defends a specific, non-deflationary approach that nevertheless qualifies as scientifically-grounded and, consequently, as acceptable from the naturalistic viewpoint. By critically assessing some recent work on science and metaphysics, we argue that such a sophisticated form of naturalism, which preserves the autonomy of metaphysics as an a priori enterprise yet pays due attention to the indications coming from our best science, is not only workable but recommended.


Metaphysics Naturalism Empiricism Modelling Theoretical virtues A priori A posteriori 



We’d like to acknowledge the helpful feedback from Travis Dumsday, Donnchadh O’Conaill, and audiences at Helsinki, Hong Kong, Rome, Urbino and Singapore, where previous versions of this paper were presented. Tahko’s research for this paper was supported by Academy of Finland grants no. 266256 and no. 274715. Morganti’s work on the paper was supported by the Italian Ministry of University and Research FIRB grant no. F81J12000430001.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Communication and Visual ArtsUniversity of Rome ‘TRE’RomeItaly
  2. 2.Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies, Theoretical PhilosophyUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland

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