Abstract
The advent of contemporary evolutionary theory ushered in the eventual decline of the theory of Aristotelian Essentialism (Æ)—for it is widely assumed that essence does not, and cannot have any proper place in the age of evolution. This paper argues that this assumption is a mistake: if Æ can be suitably evolved, it need not face extinction. In it, I claim that if that theory’s fundamental ontology consists of dispositional properties, and if its characteristic metaphysical machinery is interpreted within the framework of contemporary evolutionary developmental biology, an evolved essentialism is available. The reformulated theory of Æ offered in this paper not only fails to fall prey to the typical collection of criticisms, but is also independently both theoretically and empirically plausible. The paper contends that, properly understood, essence belongs in the age of evolution.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
I borrow this colourful phrasing from Hacking (2007).
As Elder (2008, p. 345) notes: “If a plurality of organisms is to populate a genuine natural kind...more is needed than just that the same phenotypic traits crop up in member after member of the plurality. The same traits must recur across all the organisms for a common reason”.
Griffiths (2002, p. 77).
Cf. Okasha (2002, p. 191).
Even the seemingly simple philosopher’s paragon of dispositionality—‘fragility’—is realised (in most cases) by a complex physical microstructure, and ‘breaking’ is in fact a complex, multi-stage process featuring the aligning of various micro-events that represent decreasing degrees of structural integrity.
That dispositional properties are responsible for establishing this type of causal connection between two states is the basis for their ubiquitous assignment as truthmakers for subjunctive conditionals (especially counterfactuals). However, spelling out precisely what the truthmaking role is, and showing that dispositional properties play it with respect to those conditionals turns out to be exceptionally tricky. As it happens, I won’t be making use of that concept here, as I’ve no need for it. For a good discussion of the related issues, see Austin (2015b) and Eagle (2009).
I’ve said “reliably and repeatedly” purposely here, as dispositional properties do not necessitate their manifestations—a fact ensured by the possibility of so-called ‘masks’, properties or processes which interrupt the causal activity of dispositional properties. See Eagle (2009), Schrenk (2010), and Mumford and Anjum (2011) for good discussions of the issue.
Of course, not all dispositions are strongly goal-directed in this sense, but the ones which will concern us here—namely, those that populate the biological realm—certainly are.
Nagel (1977, p. 272).
Indeed, as many have now argued, ‘modularity’ may very well be a necessary requisite for the process of evolution: we may need variability to occur within discrete elements which doesn’t affect other elements if organisms are going to survive mutations and be subsequently subject to selection pressures. See Lewontin (1978) and Altenberg (1995).
Müller (2008, p. 10).
See Wagner and Altenberg (1996).
See Salazar-Ciudad and Jernvall (2013) for the concept of ‘causality horizons’ in explanations of developmental morphology.
It’s plausible that there are at least four distinct “levels” of morphological organisation—see Rasskin-Gutman (2003).
Thus, in the context of dynamical systems theory, the morphological structures associated with these modules are often characterised as ‘attractor-states’ which shape the “valleys” of an organisms’ epigenetic landscape, resulting in many distinct developmental pathways leading to the same end-state. See Jaeger and Monk (2014), and Striedter (1998).
See Amundson (2005) for an excellent in-depth discussion of the ‘structuralist’ paradigm and its relation to that of the Modern Synthesis.
Cf. Müller (2008).
Wagner (2014, pp. 92–93) argues that ‘character-identity’ determination (a) cannot be specified by positional information, given that they are variable in and among instances, and that it likewise (b) cannot be specified by downstream target genes, given not only their similar variability, but also their regulatory dependence upon upstream modules.
Müller (2008, p. 19).
Accordingly, given our knowledge of the existence of highly conserved developmental mechanisms—such as “toolkit” genes, discussed earlier—every natural kind will share a significant proportion of their essential properties, these being ontological traces of their evolutionary origins.
For a defence of the ‘prime mover’ aspect of this claim, see Austin (2015a).
In fact, it’s for this very reason that Wagner (2014, p. 20) refers to his modelling of developmental modules as a theory of ‘variational structuralism’.
According to this conception of the Aristotelian ‘natural state’, if we want to carve the world into proper natural kinds, it won’t be enough to group together organisms which share exact morphologies—rather, as evo-devo has taught us, we must look conceptually underneath those morphologies.
If, as Rosenberg (2001) argues, the process of natural selection operates on function, and is rather “blind” to structure, we shouldn’t expect the essence of a natural kind, being so central to the process of ontogenic development, to be necessarily tied-up to a particular material realisation base.
In the context of evo-devo, these sorts of studies may already be taking place. With respect to (a), investigating the effect of regulatory novelties on homology-generating pathways via mutation or epigenetic marking may be a viable way of discerning the arrival of novel phenomodulatory dispositions: see Wagner (2014), and Webster and Goodwin (2006). With respect to (b), the method of distinguishing two homologous modules in virtue of their non-overlapping sets of morphospace ‘character states’ may constitute an empirical method of detecting the presence of distinct phenomodulatory dispositions: see Wagner’s (2014) discussion of representing the ‘variational modalities’ of homologous structures.
References
Altenberg, L. (1995). Genome growth and the evolution of the genotype-phenotype map. In W. Banzhaf & F. Eeckman (Eds.), Evolution and biocomputation: Computational models of evolution (pp. 205–250). Berlin: Springer.
Amundson, R. (2005). The Changing role of the embryo in evolutionary thought: Roots of Evo-Devo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ashery-Padan, R., & Gruss, P. (2001). Pax6 lights-up the way for eye development. Current Opinion in Cell Biology, 13(6), 706–714.
Aubin-Horth, N., & Renn, S. (2009). Genomic reaction norms: Using integrative biology to understand molecular mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity. Molecular Ecology, 18(18), 3763–3780.
Austin, C. J. (2015a). The dispositional genome: Primus inter pares. Biology and Philosophy, 30(2), 227–246.
Austin, C. J. (2015b). The truthmaking argument against dispositionalism. Ratio, 28(3), 271–285.
Balme, D. (1987). Teleology and necessity. In A. Gotthelf & J. Lennox (Eds.), Philosophical issues in Aristotle’s biology (pp. 275–285). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bhattacharya, S., Zhang, Q., & Andersen, M. (2011). A deterministic map of Waddington’s epigenetic landscape for cell fate specification. BMC Systems Biology, 5, 1–11.
Bolker, J. (2000). Modularity in development and why it matters to evo-devo. Integrative & Comparitive Biology, 40(5), 770–776.
Boulter, S. J. (2012). Can evolutionary biology do without Aristotelian essentialism? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 70, 83–103.
Boyd, R. (1999). Homeostasis, species, and higher taxa. In R. Wilson (Ed.), Species: New interdisciplinary essays (pp. 141–186). Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Cross, T. (2005). What is a disposition? Synthese, 144(3), 321–341.
Davila-Velderrain, J., Martinez-Garcia, J. C., & Alvarez-Buyila, E. R. (2015). Modeling the epigenetic attractors landscape: Toward a post-genomic mechanistic understanding of development. Frontiers in Genetics,. doi:10.3389/fgene.2015.00160.
Deutsch, J. (2005). Hox and wings. BioEssays, 27(7), 673–675.
Devitt, M. (2008). Resurrecting biological essentialism. Philosophy of Science, 75(3), 344–382.
Dupre, J. (2013). Living causes. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 87(1), 19–38.
Eagle, A. (2009). Causal structuralism, dispositional actualism, and counterfactual conditionals. In T. Hanfield (Ed.), Dispositions and causes (pp. 65–99). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Eble, G. (2005). Morphological modularity and macroevolution: Conceptual and empirical aspects. In W. Callebaut & D. Rasskin-Gutman (Eds.), Modularity: Understanding the Development and evolution of natural complex systems (pp. 221–239). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Edelman, G., & Gally, J. (2001). Degeneracy and complexity in biological systems. Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences, 98(24), 13763–13768.
Elder, C. (2008). Biological species are natural kinds. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 46(3), 339–362.
Ellis, B. (2010). Causal powers and categorical properties. In A. Marmodoro (Ed.), The metaphysics of powers: Their grounding and their manifestations (pp. 133–142). New York: Routledge.
Fusco, G., & Minelli, A. (2010). Phenotypic plasticity in development and evolution: Facts and concepts. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 365, 547–556.
Galis, F., & Metz, J. (2001). Testing the vulnerability of the phylotypic stage: On modularity and evolutionary conservation. Journal of Experimental Zoology, 291(2), 195–204.
Gilbert, S., & Bolker, J. (2001). Homologies of process and modular elements of embryonic construction. Journal of Experimental Zoology, 29(11), 1–12.
Gould, S. J. (1985). The Flamingo’s smile: Reflections in natural history. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Griffiths, P. (2002). What is innateness. Monist, 85(1), 70–85.
Gurdon, J., & Bourillot, P. (2001). Morphogen gradient interpretation. Nature, 413, 797–803.
Hacking, I. (2007). Natural kinds: Rosy dawn, scholastic twilight. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 61, 203–239.
Halder, G., Callaerts, P., & Gehring, W. (1995). Induction of ectopic eyes by targeted expression of the eyeless gene in Drosophilia. Science, 267, 1788–1792.
Huang, S. (2012). The molecular and mathematical basis of Waddington’s epigenetic landscape: A framework for post-darwinian biology? Bioessays, 34(2), 149–157.
Hull, D. (1999). On the plurality of species: Questioning the party line. In R. Wilson (Ed.), Species: new interdisciplinary essays (pp. 23–48). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Jacobs, J. (2011). Powerful qualities, not pure powers. The Monist, 94, 81–102.
Jaeger, J., & Monk, N. (2014). Bioattractors: Dynamical systems theory and the evolution of regulatory processes. Journal of Physiology, 592(11), 2267–2281.
Kalinka, A., Varga, K., Gerrard, D., Preibisch, S., Corcoran, D., Jarrells, J., et al. (2010). Gene expression divergence recapituates the developmental hourglass model. Nature, 468(7325), 811–814.
Lennox, J. G. (1987). Kinds, forms of kinds, and the more and the less in Aristotle’s biology. In A. Gotthelf & J. G. Lennox (Eds.), Philosophical issues in Aristotle’s biology (pp. 339–359). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lennox, J. (2001). Material and formal natures in Aristotle’s de Partibus Animalium. In J. Lennox (Ed.), Aristotle’s philosophy of biology (pp. 182–204). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, D. (2000). Causation as influence. The Journal of Philosophy, 97(4), 182–197.
Lewontin, R. (1978). Adaption. Scientific American, 239, 212–228.
Manley, D., & Wasserman, R. (2008). On linking dispositions and conditionals. Mind, 117, 59–84.
Mann, R., & Carroll, B. (2002). Molecular mechanics of selector gene function and evolution. Current Opinion in Genetics & Development, 12(5), 592–600.
Martin, C. (2008). The mind in nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mayr, E. (1976). Evolution and the diversity of life. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mayr, E. (1992). The idea of teleology. Journal of the History of Ideas, 53(1), 117–135.
McGhee, G. (2006). The geometry of evolution: Adaptive landscapes and theoretical morphospaces. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Müller, G. (2003). Homology: The evolution of morphological organization. In G. B. Muller & S. A. Newman (Eds.), Origination of organismal form: Beyond the gene in developmental and evolutionary biology (pp. 51–69). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Müller, G. (2008). Evo-devo as a discipline. In A. Minelli & G. Fusco (Eds.), Evolving pathways: Key themes in evolutionary developmental biology (pp. 3–29). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Müller, G., & Newman, S. A. (1999). Generation, integration, autonomy: Three steps in the evolution of homology. Novartis Foundation Symposia, 222, 65–73.
Mumford, S., & Anjum, R. (2011). Getting causes from powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nagel, E. (1977). Goal-directed processes in biology. The Journal of Philosophy, 74(5), 261–279.
Newman, S., Forgacs, G., & Muller, G. (2006). Before programs: The physical origination of multicellular forms. International Journal of Developmental Biology, 50, 289–299.
Newman, S., & Muller, G. (2006). Genes and form: Inherency in the evolution of developmental mechanisms. In E. Neumann-Held & C. Rehmann-Sutter (Eds.), Genes in development: Re-reading the molecular paradigm (pp. 38–77). Durham: Duke University Press.
Oderberg, D. (2009). The non-identity of the categorical and dispositional. Analysis, 66(2), 677–684.
Okasha, S. (2002). Darwinian metaphysics: Species and the question of essentialism. Sythese, 131(2), 191–213.
Pellegrin, P. (1987). Logical difference and biological difference: The unity of Aristotle’s thought. In A. Gotthelf & J. Lennox (Eds.), Philosophical issues in Aristotle’s biology (pp. 313–338). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pigliucci, M. (2001). Phenotypic plasticity: Beyond nature and nurture. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Raff, R., & Sly, B. (2000). Modularity and dissociation in the evolution of gene expression territories in development. Evolution and Development, 2(2), 102–113.
Rasskin-Gutman, D. (2003). Boundary constraints for the emergence of form. In G. Muller & S. Newman (Eds.), The origination of organismal form (pp. 305–322). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Rasskin-Gutman, D. (2005). Modularity: Jumping forms within morphospace. In W. Callebaut, D. Rasskin-Gutman, & H. Simon (Eds.), Modularity: Understanding the development and evolution of natural complex systems (pp. 207–219). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Rosa, L., & Etxeberria, A. (2011). Pattern and process in Evo-Devo: Descriptions and explanations. In H. de Regt, S. Hartmann & S. Okasha (Eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009 (pp. 263–274). Netherlands: Springer.
Rosenberg, A. (2001). On multiple realization and the special sciences. The Journal of Philosophy, 98(7), 365–373.
Salazar-Ciudad, I., & Jernvall, J. (2013). The causality horizon and the developmental bases of morphological evolution. Biological Theory, 8(3), 286–292.
Schlichting, C., & Smith, H. (2002). Phenotypic plasticity: Linking molecular mechanisms with evolutionary outcomes. Evolutionary Ecology, 16(3), 189–211.
Schrenk, M. (2010). The powerlessness of necessity. Nous, 44(4), 725–739.
Shubin, N., Tabin, C., & Carroll, S. (2009). Deep homology and the origins of evolutionary novelty. Nature, 457, 818–823.
Sober, E. (1980). Evolution, population thinking, and essentialism. (E. Sober, Ed.). Philosophy of Science, 47(3), 350–383.
Striedter, G. (1998). Stepping into the same river twice: Homologues as recurring attractors in epigenetic landscapes. Brain, Behavior and Evolution, 52, 218–231.
Tabata, T. (2001). Genetics of morphogen gradients. Nature, 2(8), 620–630.
Verd, B., Crombach, A., & Jaeger, J. (2014). Classification of transient behaviours in a time-dependent toggle switch model. BMC Systems Biology, 8(1), 1–19.
Vetter, B. (2013). Multi-track dispositions. The Philosophical Quarterly, 63, 330–352.
von Dassow, G., Meir, E., Munro, E. M., & Odell, G. M. (2000). The segment polarity network is a robust developmental module. Nature, 406, 188–192.
Von Dassow, G., & Munro, E. (1999). Modularity in animal development and evolution: Elements of a conceptual framework for evo devo. Journal of Experimental Zoology, 285(4), 307–325.
Wagner, G. (2000). Characters, units and natural kinds: An introduction. In G. Wagner (Ed.), The character concept in evolutionary biology (pp. 1–10). Greenwich, CT: Academic Press.
Wagner, G. (2007). The developmental genetics of homology. Nature Review of Genetics, 8(6), 473–479.
Wagner, G. (2014). Homology, genes, and evolutionary innovation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wagner, G., & Altenberg, L. (1996). Complex adaptations and the evolution of evolvability. Evolution, 50(3), 967–976.
Walsh, D. (2006). Evolutionary essentialism. British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 57(2), 425–448.
Walsh, D. (2012). Mechanism and purpose: A case of natural teleology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological Biomedical Sciences, 43(1), 173–181.
Wang, J., Zhang, K., Xu, L., & Wang, E. (2011). Quantifying the Waddington landscape and biological paths for development and differentiation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 108(20), 8257–8262.
Webster, G., & Goodwin, C. (2006). The origin of species: A structuralist approach. In E. Neumann-Held & C. Rehmann-Sutter (Eds.), Genes in development: Re-reading the molecular paradigm (pp. 99–134). Durham: Duke University Press.
West-Eberhard, M. (2003). Developmental plasticity and evolution. New York: Oxford University Press.
Whitacre, J., & Bender, A. (2010). Networked buffering: A basic mechanism for distributed robustness in complex adaptive systems. Theoretical Biology and Medical Modelling, 7(20), 1–20.
Whitman, D. W., & Agrawal, A. A. (2009). What is phenotypic plasiticty and why is it important? In T. N. Ananthakrishna & D. W. Whitman (Eds.), Phenotypic plasticity of insects: Mechanisms and consequences (pp. 1–63). Enfield: Science Publishers.
Wilkins, J. (2013). Biological essentialism and the tidal change of natural kinds. Science & Education, 22(2), 221–240.
Wilson, R. (1999). Realism, essence, and kind: resucitating species essentialism? In R. Wilson (Ed.), Species: new interdisciplinary essays (pp. 187–208). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Wilson, R., Barker, M., & Brigandt, I. (2007). When traditional essentialism fails: Biological natural kinds. Philosophical Topics, 35, 189–215.
Winther, R. G. (2001). Varities of modules: Kinds, levels, origins, and behaviors. Journal of Experimental Zoology, 291(2), 116–129.
Woodward, J. (2003). Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Woodward, J. (2010). Causation in biology: Stability, specificity, and the choice of levels of explanation. Biology and Philosophy, 25(3), 287–318.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful for the generous support of the Analysis Trust.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Austin, C.J. Aristotelian essentialism: essence in the age of evolution. Synthese 194, 2539–2556 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1066-4
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1066-4