A robust enough virtue epistemology
What is the nature of knowledge? A popular answer to that long-standing question comes from robust virtue epistemology, whose key idea is that knowing is just a matter of succeeding cognitively—i.e., coming to believe a proposition truly—due to an exercise of cognitive ability. Versions of robust virtue epistemology further developing and systematizing this idea offer different accounts of the relation that must hold between an agent’s cognitive success and the exercise of her cognitive abilities as well as of the very nature of those abilities. This paper aims to give a new robust virtue epistemological account of knowledge based on a different understanding of the nature and structure of the kind of abilities that give rise to knowledge.
KeywordsRobust virtue epistemology Ability Cognitive ability Aptness Safety
Thanks to Chris Kelp, two anonymous reviewers for Synthese, and the audiences of the LEG seminar (Leuven), the University of Copenhagen, and the Virtue Epistemology Conference (Leuven).
- Blouw, P., Buckwalter, W., & Turri, J. (2016). Gettier cases: A taxonomy. In R. Borges, C. de Almeida, & P. Klein (Eds.), Explaining knowledge: New essays on the Gettier problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Broncano-Berrocal, F. (2014a). Anti-luck (too weak) virtue epistemology. Erkenntnis, 79(4), 733–754.Google Scholar
- Broncano-Berrocal, F. (2014b). Is safety in danger? Philosophia, 42(1), 63–81.Google Scholar
- Hawley, K. (2003). Success and Knowledge-How. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40, 19–31.Google Scholar
- Haddock, A., Millar, A., & Pritchard, D. (2010). The nature and value of Knowledge: Three investigations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.Google Scholar
- Maier, J. (2013). The agentive modalities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 87, 113–134.Google Scholar
- Millikan, R. (1984). Language, thought, and other biological categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
- Palermos, S. O. (2013). Could reliability naturally imply safety? European Journal of Philosophy,. doi: 10.1111/ejop.12046.
- Pritchard, D. (2006). A defence of quasi-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony. Philosophica, 78, 13–28.Google Scholar
- Turri, J. (2011). Manifest failure: The Gettier problem solved. Philosophers’ Imprint, 11, 1–11.Google Scholar
- Turri, J. (2016). Knowledge as achievement, more or less. In M. A. Fernández (Ed.), Performance epistemology (pp. 124–136). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar