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Synthese

, Volume 194, Issue 5, pp 1765–1785 | Cite as

On the explanatory power of hallucination

  • Dominic Alford-Duguid
  • Michael Arsenault
Article
  • 252 Downloads

Abstract

Pautz (Perceiving the world , 2010) has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large.

Keywords

Mind Perception Intentionalism Naive realism Hallucination Acquaintance Thought 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Michael Arsenault’s contribution was aided by funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) award number 752-2012-2079. For comments and conversation, thanks to: Fatema Amijee, Adam Bradley, John Campbell, Imogen Dickie, Benj Hellie, Zac Irving, Alex Kerr, Diana Raffman, Mason Westfall. Thanks also to two anonymous referees for their immensely helpful feedback.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of TorontoTorontoCanada
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of California, BerkeleyBerkeleyUSA

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