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Synthese

, Volume 194, Issue 4, pp 1233–1244 | Cite as

Lotteries and justification

  • Christoph KelpEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

The lottery paradox shows that the following three individually highly plausible theses are jointly incompatible: (i) highly probable propositions are justifiably believable, (ii) justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction, (iii) known contradictions are not justifiably believable. This paper argues that a satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox must reject (i) as versions of the paradox can be generated without appeal to either (ii) or (iii) and proposes a new solution to the paradox in terms of a novel account of justified believability.

Keywords

Epistemology Virtue epistemology Knowledge first epistemology Lottery Paradox Justified belief 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to the audiences of the following conferences for helpful feedback on the material of this paper: 2012 EEN Meeting, Universities of Bologna and Modena (2012); CCPEA, Academia Sinica, Taipei (2012); 2013 Bled Philosophical Conferences, Bled (2013); Epistemic Justification and Reasons, University of Luxembourg (2013); Neue Perspektiven der Epistemischen Rechtfertigung, University of Dresden (2013), Saving Safety, Bonn (2013), Yonsei Philosophy Summer Conference, Yonsei University (2014); Normative Epistemic Reasons, University of Luxembourg (2014), The Virtue Turn, University of Taipei (2014); 2015 Bled Philosophical Conferences, Bled (2015). Thanks also to the Leuven Epistemology Group and two anonymous referees of this journal for their feedback on the paper. Special thanks to Harmen Ghijsen and Mona Simionescu for commenting on various versions of the paper. This work was funded by grants from KU Leuven’s Special Research Fund (BOF) and Research Foundation Flanders (FWO).

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy, Institute of PhilosophyKU LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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