Synthese

, Volume 194, Issue 3, pp 917–939

The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0979-7

Cite this article as:
Skovgaard-Olsen, N. Synthese (2017) 194: 917. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0979-7
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Abstract

The main goal of this paper is to investigate what explanatory resources Robert Brandom’s distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. One such case in particular is the preface paradox, which will receive an extensive treatment. As we shall see, the problem of logical omniscience not only arises within theories based on deductive logic; but also within the recent paradigm shift in psychology of reasoning. So dealing with this problem is important not only for philosophical purposes but also from a psychological perspective.

Keywords

The problem of logical omniscience Rationality Inferentialism Doxastic commitments Reasons Psychology of reasoning Brandom 

Funding information

Funder NameGrant NumberFunding Note
Grant to Wolfgang Spohn from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) as part of the priority program “New Frameworks of Rationality” (SPP 1516) for the project ‘Reason Relations, Argumentation, and Conditionals’

    Copyright information

    © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

    Authors and Affiliations

    1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of KonstanzKonstanzGermany
    2. 2.Department of PsychologyUniversity of FreiburgFreiburgGermany
    3. 3.Freiburg, HerdernGermany

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