An elegant universe
David Lewis famously endorsed Unrestricted Composition. His defense of such a controversial principle builds on the alleged innocence of mereology. This innocence defense has come under different attacks in the last decades. In this paper I pursue another line of defense, that stems from some early remarks by van Inwagen. I argue that Unrestricted Composition leads to a better metaphysics. In particular I provide new arguments for the following claims: Unrestricted Composition entails extensionality of composition, functionality of location and four-dimensionalism in the metaphysics of persistence. Its endorsement yields an impressively coherent and powerful metaphysical picture. This picture shows a universe that might not be innocent but it is certainly elegant.
KeywordsUnrestricted composition Extensionality Functionality Four-dimensionalism
I am extremely grateful to two anonymous referees for this journal for detailed and insightful comments on different drafts of the paper which led to substantive revisions and improvements. Part of this work was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation, Project Number BSCGI0_157792.
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