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Synthese

, Volume 194, Issue 5, pp 1487–1502 | Cite as

Commodious knowledge

  • Christoph KelpEmail author
  • Mona Simion
S.I.: Truth & Epistemic Norms

Abstract

This paper offers a novel account of the value of knowledge. The account is novel insofar as it advocates a shift in focus from the value of individual items of knowledge to the value of the commodity of knowledge. It is argued that the commodity of knowledge is valuable in at least two ways: (i) in a wide range of areas, knowledge is our way of being in cognitive contact with the world and (ii) for us the good life is a life rich enough in knowledge.

Keywords

Epistemology Value of knowledge Meno problem 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Synthese’s referees for their thoughtful comments on this paper. This work was funded by an OT grant from KU Leuven’s Special Research Fund (BoF).

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Logic and Analytic PhilosophyKU LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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