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Synthese

pp 1–15 | Cite as

Historical inductions, Old and New

  • Juha Saatsi
S.I.: Conceived Alternatives

Abstract

I review prominent historical arguments against scientific realism to indicate how they display a systematic overshooting in the conclusions drawn from the historical evidence. The root of the overshooting can be located in some critical, undue presuppositions regarding realism. I will highlight these presuppositions in connection with both Laudan’s ‘Old induction’ and Stanford’s New induction, and then delineate a minimal realist view that does without the problematic presuppositions.

Keywords

Realism Pessimistic induction Stanford 

Notes

Acknowledgments

A version of this paper was presented at the Unconceived Alternatives Workshop in Durham. I would like to thank the workshop audience. Special thanks to Kyle Stanford.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of LeedsLeedsUK

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