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Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy

  • S.I. : Truth & Epistemic Norms
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Abstract

Engel (Grazer Philos Stud 77: 45–59, 2008) has insisted that a number of notable strategies for rejecting the knowledge norm of assertion are put forward on the basis of the wrong kinds of reasons. A central aim of this paper will be to establish the contrast point: I argue that one very familiar strategy for defending the knowledge norm of assertion—viz., that it is claimed to do better in various respects than its competitors (e.g. the justification and the truth norms)—relies on a presupposition that is shown to be ultimately under-motivated. That presupposition is the uniqueness thesis—that there is a unique epistemic rule for assertion, and that such a rule will govern assertions uniformly. In particular, the strategy I shall take here will be to challenge the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm in a way that at the same time counts against Williamson’s (Knowledge and its limits, 2000) own rationale for the uniqueness thesis. However, rather than to challenge the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm via the familiar style of ‘expert opinion’ and, more generally, ‘second-hand knowledge’ cases (e.g. Lackey in Learning from words: testimony as a source of knowledge, 2008), a strategy that has recently been called into question by Benton (Philos Phenomenol Res, 2014), I’ll instead advance a very different line of argument against the sufficiency thesis, one which turns on a phenomenon I call epistemic hypocrisy.

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Notes

  1. Cf. Pagin (2006) for a criticism.

  2. In particular, Engel thinks that such oversights explain why we some are taken to thinking Jennifer Lackey’s (2007) selfless assertion cases—cases where assertions are claimed appropriate in the absence of the satisfaction of the belief condition—are a datum from which it should be concluded that KN and KAA are false.

  3. As Engel puts it, ‘There is a clear sense in which a belief which is held for reasons which fall short of being epistemic—for instance a self deceptive belief or one which we aim to have to secure a form of comfort- still counts as a belief, so why could not assertions which are made for reasons which fall short of being epistemic, or which happen to be epistemically weak fail to count as assertions?’

  4. See here, for instance, (Engel 2007, 2013). In doing so, he’s taken particular care to make it apparent how being subject to a norm needn’t involve any positive avowal to conform to it (which is why desiring to hold false beliefs for pragmatic reasons, for instance, is not a datum that should lead us to think truth is not the standard of correctness for belief.)  Cf.Shah and Velleman (2005).

  5. The claim I shall be interested in here is the view that the knowledge norm is the unique epistemic rule for assertion. This is implied by, but does not imply, the stronger claim formulated in terms of the rule being constitutive of assertion.

  6. For discussion on this point, see also Carter and Gordon (2011).

  7. My italics.

  8. I am taking ‘worked’ here to mean: is true, or perhaps, is appropriately defensible.

  9. I am reading Williamson in this passage as regarding establishing the knowledge norm to be a task that is theoretically prior to establishing uniqueness–that is, that establishing uniqueness would be itself be an artefact of establishing the knowledge norm, and in such a way that evidence against the knowledge norm would be evidence against uniqueness. While I think this is the right way to understand what Williamson is saying here, it’s also fair to point out that we can imagine a much wider kind of rationale for uniqueness, one on which uniqueness (paired with the knowledge norm) fits naturally within a picture on which knowledge is regarded as playing a range of theoretically explanatory roles characteristic of the knowledge-first approach. And so it’s appropriate to evaluate Williamson’s remarks here within a wider context–a context where knowledge as a unique epistemic rule governing assertion fits within a wider picture. That being said, reason to think that knowledge is not a unique epistemic rule governing assertion is at the same time evidence against this wider picture. The same point can be made were it to turn out that, for instance, Gerken (2014) is right that no unique epistemic credential warrants practical deliberation. Thus, while it’s not charitable to suppose that there is not also a wider philosophical motivation for Williamson’s embracing of uniqueness in play in the background, this wider philosophical motivation is less compelling if we have reason to doubt the knowledge norm. Thanks to an anonymous referee at Synthese for requesting further elaboration on this point.

  10. An anonymous referee raises the question of whether it would be open for Williamson to embrace a no epistemic status variation on the sufficiency thesis, in conjunction the view that knowledge is always necessary for epistemically appropriate assertion. On this envisioned view, Williamson would be embracing the necessity leg of the knowledge norm while denying that there is any epistemic status such that that status is sufficient as an epistemic credential to warrant assertion. While I’ve argued elsewhere (2011) that option’s not available to Williamson, I won’t rely on this point here. Rather, I think it’s worth pointing out why I think embracing a ‘no epistemic status’ view (with respect to the sufficiency leg) would be an unprincipled position for any defender of the knowledge norm’s necessity leg, even if the no epistemic status view were independently plausible. The reasoning here is as follows. Firstly, unless we want to embrace an error-theory according to which all assertions are epistemically impermissible, we should accept it as a datum that assertions are often epistemically permissible. The best explanation for why this datum, along with the no-epistemic-status view of the sufficiency leg would be jointly true would be epistemic norm pluralism, the view that when assertion is epistemically permissible, this will be in virtue of different epistemic statuses being satisfied in different cases. But embracing epistemic norm pluralism for the sufficiency leg and the knowledge norm for the necessity leg is a theoretically unstable pairing. All things equal, we should expect a pluralist about the sufficiency leg to be a pluralist about the necessity leg. More weakly, there is additional explanatory burden on one who is a pluralist about the sufficiency leg while denying pluralism about the necessity leg.

  11. See Carter and Gordon (2011).

  12. The term ‘epistemic credential’ is Lackey’s (2012).

  13. This is not to say that there has not been criticism of the sufficiency thesis. See fn. 16.

  14. See, however, Benton (2014) for some resistance to this point. I don’t have the space to rehearse my previous argument to this effect here, but want to offer two clarificatory comments. Firstly, I don’t regard a commitment to the necessity leg of the knowledge norm to entail a commitment to the sufficiency leg. That is too strong: however, what I’ve suggested before is that a commitment to the sufficiency leg is clearly implicit in defences of the knowledge account of assertion, where the necessity leg is primarily what is at issue. I am taking it that if the sufficiency thesis is false, then this is evidence against the knowledge account of assertion, even if it does not entail the falsity of the necessity leg of this account. Secondly, the hypocrisy-based argument I outlined in what follows, here goes through in a qualified way even if this is false—viz even if we can glean nothing more from evidence against KNA-Suff than that KNA-Suff is false—as (and as Benton 2014 highlights) whether this sufficiency leg is true has enjoyed considerable debate recently outwith the wider question of the knowledge account of assertion, more generally.

  15. See footnote 8 for elaboration on this point, and some qualification.

  16. See, for example, along with Lackey (2012, 2014), Coffman (2011), McKinnon (2012), Gerken (2014), Carter and Gordon (2011), cf. Benton (2014).

  17. Carter and Gordon (2011).

  18. Cf.Lackey (2013) for a criticism of the view that understanding is what’s lacking in these cases.

  19. According to Douven’s (2006) preferred version of the justification norm, which he calls the Rational Credibility Norm of Assertion, one is properly epistemically positioned to assert only what is rationally credible to one.

  20. On Lackey’s (2007) construal of the justification norm, which she calls the Reasonable to Believe Norm of Assertion, one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p only if (i) it is reasonable to one to believe that p, and (ii) if one asserted that p, one would assert that p at least in part because it is reasonable for one to believe that p.

  21. Kvanvig (2009) preferred account of the justification norm makes reference to one’s total perspective providing one with good reasons or justification for p.

  22. I don’t want to suggest that this premise holds for all varieties of context sensitivity, just standard ones. For example, a relativist (e.g. MacFarlane 2005, 2014) would have comparably more scope to resist (2). However, even if justification were assessment-sensitive along the model MacFarlane develops in defending a truth-relative semantics for ‘knows’, it’s not obvious that relativists would be inclined to deny (2). After all, if the case-pair is evaluated relative to the same context of assessment, we can easily envision the relativist agreeing with (2).

  23. If (simply) an improvement in one’s epistemic grounds is all that would be needed to separate a defective assertion from a permissible assertion, then it’s plausible to think this assertion is epistemically criticisable, rather than criticisable in some other way. After all, it’s specifically the epistemic grounds that make the difference. Also, as a point of clarification: it would be a mistake to think that Nina, in ADOPTION-2, is merely violating some sort of pragmatic, Gricean norm, according to which one ‘shouldn’t assert hypocritically’ even while passing scrutiny from an epistemic point of view. Firstly, the account of epistemic defectiveness just proposed (i.e. that an assertion is epistemically criticisable if all that separates it from being permissible is need for improved epistemic grounds) implies that Nina’s assertion is epistemically defective even if it violates some other Gricean norm prohibiting hypocrisy; the two needn’t be mutually exclusive. Secondly, a Gricean norm according to which assertions shouldn’t be hypocritical would more plausibly be construed as a non-epistemic norm that is violated only when one’s explicitly asserted prescription or evaluation involves a double-standard.

  24. As Brandom (1983, p. 640) puts the idea: “The asserted sentence warrants the audience to assert just those sentences which may appropriately be inferred from the original claim.” Cf. Brown (2010, p. 145) for a more detailed discussion of the licensing view, and its connection to epistemic norms of assertion.

  25. I want to briefly comment on the connection between EIN and a related epistemic norm that has been defended by Jim Stone (2007) and which also links epistemically appropriate assertion with action. On Stone’s account, S is entitled to assert p when S believes p on the basis of evidence that makes believing p reasonable, so much so that, under the circumstances, it’s reasonable to act on p. I think Stone’s account has merits that the traditional norms lack, but unlike EIN, Stone’s account is going to fall in step with the knowledge, justification and truth norms in counting epistemically hypocritical assertions as free from epistemic scrutiny. After all, one might not actually be disposed to act on the epistemic grounds one has even if it would be reasonable (given these grounds) for her to do so.

  26. It should be clear how the same cookbook recipe can be generated against the truth norm.

  27. This should be unobjectionable to epistemologists who accept even weak versions of fallibilism.

  28. Even for philosophers who reject fallibilism, the argument I’ve adduced here against the KNA should go through. This is because all that is needed to generate a case where one satisfies the KNA but nonetheless asserts in a way that is epistemically criticisable is for one to be unwilling to act on one’s epistemic grounds because she doesn’t take them to be sufficient to warrant (her own) action. So long as she wouldn’t act on her knowledge (in part because she judges her epistemic grounds to be epistemically inadequate), and yet asserts her item of knowledge which she believes to be unactionable for her, her assertion counts as epistemically defective (by EIN) even though satisfying the KNA.

  29. It will be helpful here to comment on the relationship between EIN and the knowledge action norm, as defended by among others Hawthorne (2004), Fanti and McGrath (2002) and Hawthorne and Stanley (2008). As Hawthorne (2004, p. 30) puts the idea: ‘...it is acceptable to use the premise that p in one’s [practical] deliberations if one knows it and . . . unacceptable to use the premise that p in one’s practical reasoning if one doesn’t know it.’ Given that the EIN, in an obvious respect, makes action relevant to whether one counts as satisfying a plausible epistemic norm on assertion, and given that the knowledge action norm directly connects action and knowledge, one might wonder whether a proponent of a knowledge action norm gets something like EIN for free. There are two reasons why this is not so. Firstly, something like Cappelen’s (2011) ‘no assertion’ view remains a theoretical possibility for one who embraces a knowledge action norm; that is, one might accept Hawthorne’s claim in the quoted passage while following Cappelen and denying that it is, as he puts it, ‘theoretically useful to single out a subset of sayings as assertions.’ Given this theoretical possibility, it’s a mistake to think that EIN, or more generally any particular epistemic norm governing assertion, is entailed by a knowledge account of action. Even more though, it’s not clear that, for one who does opt for some epistemic norm governing assertion, that embracing the knowledge action norm obviously recommends EIN, a result which further suggests the views are theoretically orthogonal. The Joe Six Pack case, for example, is one that satisfies the EIN but which violates the knowledge-action norm. Thanks to an anonymous referee at Synthese for requesting further discussion on this point.

  30. Warfarin thins the blood, which prevents its ability to clot. Significant alcohol consumption enhances Warfarin’s effect.

  31. Cf. Turri (2014) who suggests that the uniqueness assumption may be rejected in favour of what he calls a pluralist axiological knowledge account of assertion (which is nevertheless, a knowledge norm of assertion). I am directing the challenge for sufficiency, as developed here, against what Turri himself rejects under the description of the simple version of the knowledge norm (Turri 2014, p. 558), which is also the standard way of thinking of the knowledge norm. I’ll remain agnostic for the present purposes whether epistemic hypocrisy cases can support counterexamples to the more complex pluralist axiological knowledge account of assertion Turri defends. Thanks to an anonymous referee at Synthese for raising this point.

  32. It is a great pleasure to contribute to Pascal Engel’s Festschrift on the occasion of his 60th birthday. One particular topic I’ve had the opportunity to discuss with him in some detail is assertion, and in particular, assertoric norms, and so naturally, this is a topic I thought would be most fitting to explore here. Thanks also to Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio and Anne Meylan and two anonymous referees at Synthese, and also to Emma C. Gordon for helpful conversation. An ancestor paper to this one ‘Engel on Knowledge Account of Assertion’–appeared in Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel, eds. J. Dutant, D. Fassio & A. Meylan, University of Geneva, 158–168.

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Carter, J.A. Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy. Synthese 194, 1463–1476 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0766-5

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