, Volume 193, Issue 1, pp 185–203 | Cite as

Does vagueness underlie the mass/count distinction?

  • David Liebesman


Does vagueness underlie the mass/count distinction? My answer is no. I motivate this answer in two ways. First, I argue against Chierchia’s (Synthese 174:99–149, 2010) recent attempt to explain the distinction in terms of vagueness. Second, I give a more general argument that no such account will succeed.


Vagueness Mass/count Philosophy of language Semantics 



Thanks to Jared Henderson and three referees for Synthese.


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of CalgaryCalgaryCanada

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