Does vagueness underlie the mass/count distinction?
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Does vagueness underlie the mass/count distinction? My answer is no. I motivate this answer in two ways. First, I argue against Chierchia’s (Synthese 174:99–149, 2010) recent attempt to explain the distinction in terms of vagueness. Second, I give a more general argument that no such account will succeed.
KeywordsVagueness Mass/count Philosophy of language Semantics
Thanks to Jared Henderson and three referees for Synthese.
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