## Abstract

The paper develops an interface between syntax-based logical models of awareness and dynamic epistemic logic. The framework is shown to be able to accommodate a variety of notions of awareness and knowledge, as well as their dynamics. This, it is argued, offers a natural formal environment for the analysis of epistemic phenomena typical of multi-agent information exchange, such as how agents become aware of relevant details, how they perform inferences and how they share their information within a group. Technically, the logics presented are all simple refinements of the logic of public announcements.

## Notes

### Acknowledgments

The authors would like to express their gratitude to two anonymous reviewers for their comments and observations, which have helped to improve this paper.

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