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Synthese

, Volume 192, Issue 9, pp 3037–3050 | Cite as

Why transparency undermines economy

  • Derek Baker
Article

Abstract

Byrne (Philos Top 33:79–104, 2005; Self-knowledge, 2011a; Consciousness of the self: new essays, 2011b; Proc Aristot Soc Suppl Vol 85:201–219, 2011c; Introspection and consciousnes, 2012) offers a novel interpretation of the idea that the mind is transparent to its possessor, and that one knows one’s own mind by looking out at the world. This paper argues that his (Byrne, Proc Aristot Soc Suppl Vol 85:201–219, 2011c; Introspection and consciousnes, 2012) attempts to extend this picture of self-knowledge force him to sacrifice the theoretical parsimony he presents as the primary virtue of his account. The paper concludes by discussing two general problems transparency accounts of self-knowledge must address.

Keywords

Self-knowledge Inference rules Perception Intention Alex Byrne 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Colin Klein, Tristram McPherson, Jack Woods, and the two anonymous referees for discussion, criticism, and helpful advice. The research in this paper was substantially funded by a grant from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. LU342612). Ideas in this paper were partly developed while visiting The Australia National University, especially thanks to discussions on the problem of self-knowledge with Ryan Cox and Daniel Stoljar.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyLingnan UniversityTuen MunHong Kong SAR

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