David Lewis in the lab: experimental results on the emergence of meaning
- 436 Downloads
In this paper we use an experimental approach to investigate how linguistic conventions can emerge in a society without explicit agreement. As a starting point we consider the signaling game introduced by Lewis (Convention 1969). We find that in experimental settings, small groups can quickly develop conventions of signal meaning in these games. We also investigate versions of the game where the theoretical literature indicates that meaning will be less likely to arise—when there are more than two states for actors to transfer meaning about and when some states are more likely than others. In these cases, we find that actors are less likely to arrive at strategies where signals have clear conventional meaning. We conclude with a proposal for extending the use of the methodology of experimental economics in experimental philosophy.
KeywordsSignaling Experimental philosophy Meaning Evolution
The authors would like to thank Andreas Blume and Elliott Wagner for comments on the paper. We would like to thank Michael McBride for advice on experimental economics and Sabine Kunrath for help with the statistical analysis of our data. Thanks to helpful audiences at GIRL 2013 and the ESSL workshop at UC Irvine 2012. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. EF 1038456. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
- Barrett, J. A. (2006). Numerical simulations of the Lewis signaling game: Learning strategies, pooling equilibria, and the evolution of grammar. Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences. Paper 54. http://repositories.cdlib.org/imbs/54.
- Blume, A., DeJong, D. V., Kim, Y. G., & Sprinkle, G. B. (1998). Experimental evidence on the evolution of meaning of messages in sender-receiver games. The American Economic Review, 88(5), 1323–1340.Google Scholar
- Davis, D., & Holt, C. A. (1993). Experimental economics: Methods, problems and promise. Estudios Económicos, 8(2), 179–212.Google Scholar
- Frolich, N., & Oppenheimer, J. (1992). Choosing justice: An experimental approach to ethical theory. Berkeley: California University Press.Google Scholar
- Huttegger, S. M., & Zollman, K. (2010). Dynamic stability and basins of attraction in the sir philip sidney game. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 94, 1–8.Google Scholar
- Lewis, D. K. (1969). Convention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
- Mehta, J., Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (1994). The nature of salience: An experimental investigation of pure coordination games. The American Economic Review, 84(3), 658–673.Google Scholar
- O’Connor, C. (2013). The evolution of vagueness. Erkenntnis, 79, 704–727.Google Scholar
- Schelling, T. C. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
- Smith, A. (1761). Considerations concerning the first formation of languages. Appended to the second edition of The theory of moral sentiments.Google Scholar
- Smith, V. (1976). Experimental economics: induced value theory. The American Economic Review, 66(2), 274–279.Google Scholar