, Volume 192, Issue 9, pp 2725–2746

The traditional conception of the a priori


DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0394-x

Cite this article as:
Jenkins, C.S.I. & Kasaki, M. Synthese (2015) 192: 2725. doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0394-x


In this paper, we explore the traditional conception of a prioricity as epistemic independence of evidence from sense experience. We investigate the fortunes of the traditional conception in the light of recent challenges by Timothy Williamson. We contend that Williamson’s arguments can be resisted in various ways. En route, we argue that Williamson’s views are not as distant from tradition (in particular, from Kant) as they might seem at first glance.


A priori A posteriori Kant Williamson Casullo Jenkins  Evidence Empirical 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of British ColumbiaVancouver Canada
  2. 2.Graduate School of Engineering ScienceOsaka UniversityToyonakaJapan

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