The traditional conception of the a priori
In this paper, we explore the traditional conception of a prioricity as epistemic independence of evidence from sense experience. We investigate the fortunes of the traditional conception in the light of recent challenges by Timothy Williamson. We contend that Williamson’s arguments can be resisted in various ways. En route, we argue that Williamson’s views are not as distant from tradition (in particular, from Kant) as they might seem at first glance.
KeywordsA priori A posteriori Kant Williamson Casullo Jenkins Evidence Empirical
The authors would like to thank audiences at the Universities of Alberta, Calgary, Georgia and Cologne for valuable feedback on earlier versions of this material. We are particularly indebted to Uygar Abaci and Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa for comments and discussion on late-stage drafts. Lastly, we thank the Government of Canada for supporting Masashi Kasaki’s research for this paper during a Government of Canada Post-Doctoral Research Fellowship.
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