Synthese

, Volume 191, Issue 10, pp 2167–2193

New foundations for counterfactuals

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0391-0

Cite this article as:
Huber, F. Synthese (2014) 191: 2167. doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0391-0

Abstract

Philosophers typically rely on intuitions when providing a semantics for counterfactual conditionals. However, intuitions regarding counterfactual conditionals are notoriously shaky. The aim of this paper is to provide a principled account of the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. This principled account is provided by what I dub the Royal Rule, a deterministic analogue of the Principal Principle relating chance and credence. The Royal Rule says that an ideal doxastic agent’s initial grade of disbelief in a proposition \(A\), given that the counterfactual distance in a given context to the closest \(A\)-worlds equals \(n\), and no further information that is not admissible in this context, should equal \(n\). Under the two assumptions that the presuppositions of a given context are admissible in this context, and that the theory of deterministic alethic or metaphysical modality is admissible in any context, it follows that the counterfactual distance distribution in a given context has the structure of a ranking function. The basic conditional logic V is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the resulting rank-theoretic semantics of counterfactuals.

Keywords

Ranking functions Counterfactuals Conditional belief Chance Credence Probability 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of TorontoTorontoCanada

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