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Synthese

, Volume 190, Issue 18, pp 4201–4214 | Cite as

Extended cognition and epistemic luck

  • J. Adam CarterEmail author
Article

Abstract

When extended cognition is extended into mainstream epistemology, an awkward tension arises when considering cases of environmental epistemic luck. Surprisingly, it is not at all clear how the mainstream verdict that agents lack knowledge in cases of environmental luck can be reconciled with principles central to extended cognition.

Keywords

Epistemic luck Extended cognition Knowledge 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to express appreciation to Emma C. Gordon, Joel Katzav, Christoph Kelp, Wybo Houkes, Benjamin Jarvis, Philip Nickel, Martin Peterson, Auke Pols, Duncan Pritchard, Krist Vaesen and two anonymous reviewers at Synthese.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Edinburgh UniversityEdinburghUK
  2. 2.Eindhoven University of TechnologyEindhovenThe Netherlands

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