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Synthese

, Volume 190, Issue 18, pp 4137–4154 | Cite as

The Kuhnian mode of HPS

  • Samuel Schindler
Article

Abstract

In this article I argue that a methodological challenge to an integrated history and philosophy of science approach put forth by Ronald Giere almost forty years ago can be met by what I call the Kuhnian mode of History and Philosophy of Science (HPS). Although in the Kuhnian mode of HPS norms about science are motivated by historical facts about scientific practice, the justifiers of the constructed norms are not historical facts. The Kuhnian mode of HPS therefore evades the naturalistic fallacy which Giere’s challenge is a version of. Against the backdrop of a discussion of Laudan’s normative naturalism I argue that the Kuhnian mode of HPS is a superior form of naturalism: it establishes contact to the practice of science without making itself dependent on its contingencies.

Keywords

History and philosophy of science Naturalistic fallacy Normativity Normative naturalism Rationality  Counterfactuals 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank two anonymous referees of this journal for their valuable remarks. I also thank the audiences at the Fourth Integrated History and Philosophy of Science (&HPS4) in Athens and at the Empirical Philosophy of Science workshop in Sandbjerg (both in 2012) for their feedback.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Physics and Astronomy, Centre for Science StudiesAarhus UniversityAarhusDenmark

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