Abstract
Bayesian epistemology tells us with great precision how we should move from prior to posterior beliefs in light of new evidence or information, but says little about where our prior beliefs come from. It offers few resources to describe some prior beliefs as rational or well-justified, and others as irrational or unreasonable. A different strand of epistemology takes the central epistemological question to be not how to change one’s beliefs in light of new evidence, but what reasons justify a given set of beliefs in the first place. We offer an account of rational belief formation that closes some of the gap between Bayesianism and its reason-based alternative, formalizing the idea that an agent can have reasons for his or her (prior) beliefs, in addition to evidence or information in the ordinary Bayesian sense. Our analysis of reasons for belief is part of a larger programme of research on the role of reasons in rational agency (Dietrich and List, Nous, 2012a, in press; Int J Game Theory, 2012b, in press).
This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.
References
Aumann R. (1976) Agreeing to disagree. The Annals of Statistics 4(6): 1236–1239
Bovens L., Hartmann S. (2003) Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Dietrich, F., & List, C. (2012a). A reason-based theory of rational choice. Nous (in press).
Dietrich, F., & List, C. (2012b). Where do preferences come from. International Journal of Game Theory (in press).
Foley R. (1991) Evidence and reasons for belief. Analysis 51(2): 98–102
Jeffrey R. (2004) Subjective probability: The real thing. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Liu F. (2010) Von Wright’s “the logic of preference” revisited. Synthese 175(1): 69–88
Osherson, D. & Weinstein, S. (2012). Preferences based on reasons. Review of Symbolic Logic (in press).
Scanlon T. (1998) What we owe to each other. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Schelling T. (1960) The strategy of conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Skorupski, J. (1997). Reasons and reason. In G. Cullity & B. Gaut (Eds.), Ethics and practical reason (pp. 345–367). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
von Wright H. G. (1963) The logic of preference. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh
Author information
Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Dietrich, F., List, C. Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology. Synthese 190, 787–808 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0224-6
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
Keywords
- Bayesian epistemology
- Doxastic reasons
- Prior and posterior beliefs
- Principle of insufficient reason
- Belief formation
- Belief change