Abstract
In this paper I present some difficulties for Lewis’s and similar theories of counterfactuals, and suggest that the problem lies in the notion of absolute similarity. In order to explain the problem, I discuss the relation between Lewis’s and Goodman’s theory, and show that the two theories are not related in the way Lewis thought they were.
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Djordjevic, V. Similarity and cotenability. Synthese 190, 681–691 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0198-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0198-4