Abstract
A number of papers have argued in favour of the material account of indicative conditionals, but typically they either concentrate on defending the account from the charge that it has counterintuitive consequences, or else focus on some particular positive argument in favour of the theory. In this paper, I survey the various positive arguments that can be given, presenting simple versions where possible and showing the connections between them. I conclude with some methodological considerations.
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Rieger, A. Conditionals are material: the positive arguments. Synthese 190, 3161–3174 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0134-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0134-7