Aggregating with reason(s)

Abstract

Judgment aggregation is naturally applied to the modeling of collective attitudes. In the individual case, we represent agents as having not just beliefs, but also as supporting them with reasons. Can the Judgment Aggregation help model a concept of collective reason? I argue that the resources of the standard judgment aggregation framework are insufficiently general. I develop a generalization of the framework that improves along this dimension. In the new framework, new aggregation rules become available, as well as a natural account of collective reasons.

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Correspondence to Fabrizio Cariani.

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Cariani, F. Aggregating with reason(s). Synthese 190, 3123–3147 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0133-8

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Keywords

  • Judgment aggregation
  • Reasons
  • Collective belief