Synthese

, Volume 190, Issue 14, pp 2821–2834 | Cite as

Empirical evidence claims are a priori

Article

Abstract

This paper responds to Achinstein’s criticism of the thesis that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim such as ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e. It shows that cases involving evidential flaws, which form the basis for Achinstein’s objections to the thesis, can satisfactorily be accounted for by appeal to changes in background information and working assumptions. The paper also argues that the a priori and empirical accounts of evidence are on a par when we consider scientific practice, but that a study of artificial intelligence might serve to differentiate them.

Keywords

Evidence A priori thesis Confirmation Working assumptions Achinstein 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyLingnan UniversityTuen Mun, N.T.Hong Kong

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