Synthese

, Volume 183, Issue 3, pp 283–311 | Cite as

Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches

Article

Abstract

We sketch a framework for building a unified science of cognition. This unification is achieved by showing how functional analyses of cognitive capacities can be integrated with the multilevel mechanistic explanations of neural systems. The core idea is that functional analyses are sketches of mechanisms, in which some structural aspects of a mechanistic explanation are omitted. Once the missing aspects are filled in, a functional analysis turns into a full-blown mechanistic explanation. By this process, functional analyses are seamlessly integrated with multilevel mechanistic explanations.

Keywords

Mechanistic explanation Functional analysis Neuroscience Psychology Mechanism sketch 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MissouriSt. LouisUSA
  2. 2.Washington University in St. LouisSt. LouisUSA

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