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The epistemic significance of address

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Abstract

The overwhelming consensus amongst epistemologists is that there is no salient epistemological difference between the addressees of a speaker’s testimony and non-addressees. I argue that this overwhelming consensus is mistaken. Addressees of a speaker’s testimony are entitled to pass the epistemic buck or defer justificatory responsibility for their beliefs back to the testimonial speaker, while non-addressees are not. I then develop a provisional account of address that is in a position to mark this epistemic distinction between addressees and non-addressees.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA

    Benjamin McMyler

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  1. Benjamin McMyler
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Correspondence to Benjamin McMyler.

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McMyler, B. The epistemic significance of address. Synthese 190, 1059–1078 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9871-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9871-2

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