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Synthese

, Volume 190, Issue 3, pp 339–352 | Cite as

One wage of unknowability

  • Dennis WhitcombEmail author
Article
  • 221 Downloads

Abstract

This article argues against fallibilist evidentialism on the basis of considerations about knowability.

Keywords

Epistemology Fallibilism Knowability Unknowability Evidentialism Evidence Justification 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyWestern Washington UniversityBellinghamUSA

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