Abstract
This paper proposes a general account of the epistemological significance of inference. This account rests on the assumption that the concept of a “justified” belief or inference is a normative concept. It also rests on a conception of belief that distinguishes both (a) between conditional and unconditional beliefs and (b) between enduring belief states and mental events of forming or reaffirming a belief, and interprets all of these different kinds of belief as coming in degrees. Conceptions of “rational coherence” and “competent inference” are then formulated, in terms of the undefeated instances of certain rules of inference. It is proposed that (non-accidental) rational coherence is a necessary and sufficient condition of justified enduring belief states, while competent inference always results in a justified mental event of some kind. This proposal turns out to tell against the view that there are any non-trivial cases of “warrant transmission failure”. Finally, it is explained how these proposals can answer the objections that philosophers have raised against the idea that justified belief is “closed” under competent inference.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Audi R. (2001) The architecture of reason. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Christensen D. (2010) Higher-order evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81: 185–215
Edgington D. (1995) On conditionals. Mind 104: 235–329
Friedman, J. (2011). Suspended judgment. Philosophical Studies, Online First (25 June), 1–17. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y.
Hall N. (1994) Correcting the guide to objective chance. Mind 103: 505–517
Harman G. (1986) Change in view: Principles of reasoning. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Jackson F. (1985) On the semantics and logic of obligation. Mind 94: 177–195
Joyce J.M. (2009) Accuracy and coherence: Prospects for an alethic epistemology of partial belief. In: Huber F., Schmidt-Petri C. (eds) Degrees of belief, Synthese Library Vol. 342. Springer, Berlin, pp 263–297
Kyburg H. (1961) Probability and the logic of rational belief. Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, CT
Lasonen-Aarnio M. (2008) Single premise deduction and risk. Philosophical Studies 141: 157–173
Lewis, D. K. (1986). A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance. Reprinted with postscripts in Lewis, Philosophical papers (Vol. II, pp. 83–113). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Moore G. E. (1939) Proof of an external world. Proceedings of the British Academy 25: 273–300
Plantinga A. (1993) Warrant: The current debate. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Schechter, J. (2011). Rational self-doubt and the failure of closure. Philosophical Studies. doi:10.10071/s11098-011-9823-1.
Turri J. (2010) On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80: 312–326
Wedgwood R. (2002a) Internalism explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65: 349–369
Wedgwood R. (2002b) Practical reason and desire. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80: 345–358
Wedgwood R. (2006) The internal and external components of cognition. In: Stainton R. (eds) Contemporary debates in cognitive science. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 307–325
Wedgwood R. (2007) The nature of normativity. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Wedgwood R. (2011) Primitively rational belief-forming processes. In: Reisner A., Steglich-Petersen A. (eds) Reasons for belief. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 180–200
Williamson T. (2000) Knowledge and its limits. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Wright C. (1985) Facts and certainty. Proceedings of the British Academy 71: 429–472
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Wedgwood, R. Justified inference. Synthese 189, 273–295 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0012-8
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0012-8