, Volume 187, Issue 2, pp 569–577 | Cite as

Ramsification and inductive inference

  • Panu Raatikainen


An argument, different from the Newman objection, against the view that the cognitive content of a theory is exhausted by its Ramsey sentence is reviewed. The crux of the argument is that Ramsification may ruin inductive systematization between theory and observation. The argument also has some implications concerning the issue of underdetermination.


Ramsey sentences Structural realism Inductive systematization 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art StudiesUniversity of HelsinkiUniversity of HelsinkiFinland

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