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Knowledge and conviction

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Abstract

Much philosophical effort has been exerted over problems having to do with the correct analysis and application of the concept of epistemic justification. While I do not wish to dispute the central place of this problem in contemporary epistemology, it seems to me that there is a general neglect of the belief condition for knowledge. In this paper I offer an analysis of ‘degrees of belief’ in terms of a quality I label ‘conviction’, go on to argue that one requires more conviction in a proposition in order to know it than to merely believe it, and conclude by suggesting that some current epistemological issues admit of new insight when we begin taking conviction seriously.

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  1. Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA

    David James Anderson

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  1. David James Anderson
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Correspondence to David James Anderson.

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Anderson, D.J. Knowledge and conviction. Synthese 187, 377–392 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9831-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9831-2

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