Abstract
The Credit Theory of Knowledge (CTK)—as expressed by such figures as John Greco, Wayne Riggs, and Ernest Sosa—holds that knowing that p implies deserving epistemic credit for truly believing that p. Opponents have presented three sorts of counterexamples to CTK: S might know that p without deserving credit in cases of (1) innate knowledge (Lackey, Kvanvig); (2) testimonial knowledge (Lackey); or (3) perceptual knowledge (Pritchard). The arguments of Lackey, Kvanvig and Pritchard, however, are effective only in so far as one is willing to accept a set of controversial background assumptions (for instance, that innate knowledge exists or that doxastic voluntarism is wrong). In this paper I mount a fourth argument against CTK, that doesn’t rest on any such controversial premise, and therefore should convince a much wider audience. In particular, I show that in cases of extended cognition (very broadly conceived), the most salient feature explaining S’s believing the truth regarding p may well be external to S, that is, it might be a feature of S’s (non-human, artifactual) environment. If so, the cognitive achievement of knowing that p is not (or only marginally) creditable to S, and hence, CTK is false.
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Acknowledgements
Research by Krist Vaesen was supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). He thanks Philip Nickel, Wybo Houkes, Martin Peterson, Anthonie Meijers, Duncan Pritchard, Andy Clark, Hans Radder, Joel Anderson, Lieven Decock, Olle Blomberg, Marieke van Holland, Auke Pols, Joel Katzav and Andreas Spahn for useful discussions on previous drafts of this paper.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Vaesen, K. Knowledge without credit, exhibit 4: extended cognition. Synthese 181, 515–529 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9744-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9744-0