Abstract
We examine some assumptions about the nature of ‘levels of reality’ in the light of examples drawn from physics. Three central assumptions of the standard view of such levels (for instance, Oppenheim and Putnam 1958) are (i) that levels are populated by entities of varying complexity, (ii) that there is a unique hierarchy of levels, ranging from the very small to the very large, and (iii) that the inhabitants of adjacent levels are related by the parthood relation. Using examples from physics, we argue that it is more natural to view the inhabitants of levels as the behaviors of entities, rather than entities themselves. This suggests an account of reduction between levels, according to which one behavior reduces to another if the two are related by an appropriate limit relation. By considering cases where such inter-level reduction fails, we show that the hierarchy of behaviors differs in several respects from the standard hierarchy of entities. In particular, while on the standard view, lower-level entities are ‘micro’ parts of higher-level entities, on our view, a system’s macro-level behavior can be seen as a (‘non-spatial’) part of its micro-level behavior. We argue that this second hierarchy is not really in conflict with the standard view and that it better suits examples of explanation in science.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Batterman R. (1995) Theories between theories. Synthese 103: 171–201. doi:10.1007/BF01090047
Batterman R. (2002) The devil in the details. Asymptotic reasoning in reduction, explanation and emergence. Oxford UP, Oxford
Bennett K. (2008) Exclusion again. In: Hohwy J., Kallestrup J. (eds) Being reduced. Oxford UP, Oxford, pp 280–306
Chen L., Goldenfeld N., Oono Y. (1994) Renormalization group theory for global asymptotic analysis. Physical Review Letters 73: 1311–1315. doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.73.1311
Heil J. (1999) Multiple realizability. American Philosophical Quarterly 36: 189–208
Hempel C. (1966) The philosophy of natural science. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs
Holmes M.H. (1995) Introduction to perturbation methods. Springer, New York
Hüttemann A., Papineau D. (2005) Physicalism decomposed. Analysis 65: 33–39
Kemeny J., Oppenheim P. (1952) On reduction. Philosophical Studies 7: 6–19
Kim J. (1998) Mind in a physical world. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Kim J. (2002) The layered model: Metaphysical considerations. Philosophical Explorations 5: 2–20
Lewis D. (1991) Parts of classes. Blackwell, Cambridge, MA
McGivern, P. (2005). Physicalism, compositionality, and parthood: A perspective from the physical sciences. Doctoral thesis, Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta.
Morrison M. (2000) Unifying Scientific theories. Cambridge UP, Cambridge
Nagel E. (1961) The Structure of science. Harcourt, New York
Nickles T. (1973) Two concepts of intertheoretic reduction. Journal of Philosophy 70: 181–201
Oppenheim, P., & Putnam, H. (1958). Unity of science as a working hypothesis. In H. Feigl et al. (Eds.), Concepts, theories, and the mind-body problem. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Vol. II, pp. 3–36). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Rueger A. (2000) Physical emergence, diachronic and synchronic. Synthese 124: 297–322
Rueger A. (2004) Reduction, autonomy and causal exclusion among physical properties. Synthese 139: 1–21
Rueger A. (2006) Functional reduction and emergence in physics. Synthese 151: 335–346
Shoemaker S. (2001) Realization and mental causation. In: Gillett C. et al. (eds) Physicalism and its discontents. Cambridge UP, Cambridge, MA, pp 74–98
Sklar L. (1967) Types of intertheoretic reduction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18: 109–124
Thalos M. (2006) Nonreductive physics. Synthese 149: 133–178
Wilson J. (1999) How superduper does a physicalist supervenience need to be? Philosophical Quarterly 49: 33–52
Wimsatt, W. C. (1994). The ontology of complex systems: Levels of organization, perspectives, and causal thickets. In M. Matthen et al. (Eds.), Biology and Society. Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Supplementary Vol. 20, pp. 207–274). Calgary: University of Calgary Press.
Yablo S. (1992) Cause and essence. Synthese 93: 403–449
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Rueger, A., McGivern, P. Hierarchies and levels of reality. Synthese 176, 379–397 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9572-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9572-2