Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Human bounds: rationality for our species

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Is there such a thing as bounded rationality? I first try to make sense of the question, and then to suggest which of the disambiguated versions might have answers. We need an account of bounded rationality that takes account of detailed contingent facts about the ways in which human beings fail to perform as we might ideally want to. But we should not think in terms of rules or norms which define good responses to an individual’s limitations, but rather in terms of desiderata, situations that limited agents can hope to achieve, and corresponding virtues of achieving them. We should not take formal theories defining optimal behavior in watered-down bounded form, even though they can impose enormous computational or cognitive demands.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Dijksterhuis A., Nordgren L.F. (2006) A theory of unconscious thought. Perspectives on Psychological Science 1: 95–109

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Foley R. (1993) Working without a net. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Gardner H. (1999) Intelligence reframed. Basic Books, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Harman G. (1986) Change in view. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson F., Pargetter R. (1986) Oughts, options, and actualism. Philosophical Review 95: 233–255

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knutson B., Wimmer E., Kuhnen C.M., Winkielman P. (2008) Nucleus accumbens activation mediates the influence of reward cues on financial risk taking. Neuroreport 19(5): 509–513

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Morton, A. Review of Pollock. Thinking about acting. Mind, (to appear).

  • Pearl J. (1984) Heuristics: Intelligent search strategies for computer problem solving. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Pollock, John (2006). Thinking about acting. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Rabinowicz W. (1995) To have one’s cake and eat it too: Sequential choice and expected utility violations’. Journal of Philosophy 92: 586–620

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sternberg, R.J., Pretz , J. (eds) (2005) Cognition and intelligence: Identifying the mechanisms of the mind. Cambridge University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Taszka T., Zielonka P. (2002) Expert judgments: Financial analysts versus weather forecasters. The Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets 3(3): 152–160

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weirich P. (2004) Realistic decision theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, 2-40 Assiniboia Hall, Edmonton, AB, T6G 2E7, Canada

    Adam Morton

Authors
  1. Adam Morton
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Adam Morton.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Morton, A. Human bounds: rationality for our species. Synthese 176, 5–21 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9481-4

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9481-4

Keywords

Search

Navigation