Bayesian probability

Abstract

Bayesian decision theory is here construed as explicating a particular concept of rational choice and Bayesian probability is taken to be the concept of probability used in that theory. Bayesian probability is usually identified with the agent’s degrees of belief but that interpretation makes Bayesian decision theory a poor explication of the relevant concept of rational choice. A satisfactory conception of Bayesian decision theory is obtained by taking Bayesian probability to be an explicatum for inductive probability given the agent’s evidence.

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Correspondence to Patrick Maher.

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Maher, P. Bayesian probability. Synthese 172, 119 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9471-6

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Keywords

  • Bayesian probability
  • Logical probability
  • Inductive probability
  • Subjective probability
  • Degrees of belief
  • Decision theory
  • Expected utility
  • Explication
  • Carnap