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The philosophical novelty of computer simulation methods


Reasons are given to justify the claim that computer simulations and computational science constitute a distinctively new set of scientific methods and that these methods introduce new issues in the philosophy of science. These issues are both epistemological and methodological in kind.

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Correspondence to Paul Humphreys.

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Humphreys, P. The philosophical novelty of computer simulation methods. Synthese 169, 615–626 (2009).

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  • Computer simulations
  • Computational science
  • Epistemic opacity
  • Semantics
  • Temporal dynamics
  • Approximations