Abstract
We know things that entail things we apparently cannot come to know. This is a problem for those of us who trust that knowledge is closed under entailment. In the paper I discuss the solutions to this problem offered by epistemic disjunctivism and contextualism. The contention is that neither of these theories has the resources to deal satisfactory with the problem.
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Gundersen, L.B. Disjunctivism, contextualism and the sceptical aporia. Synthese 171, 387–397 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9320-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9320-z