, Volume 159, Issue 3, pp 475–491 | Cite as

Narrators and comparators: the architecture of agentive self-awareness



This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a high-level, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based account. We argue that an agent’s narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible for action-production.


Agency Narrative self-conception Comparators Agentive judgment Agentive experience 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.St. Catherine’s CollegeUniversity of OxfordOxfordUK
  2. 2.Institut Jean-Nicod UMR 8129, CNRS-EHESS-ENSPavillon Jardin Ecole Normale SupérieureParisFrance

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