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Perceptual systems and realism

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Abstract

Constructivism undermines realism by arguing that experience is mediated by concepts, and that there is no direct way to examine those aspects of objects that belong to them independently of our conceptualizations; perception is theory-laden. To defend realism one has to show first that perception relates us directly with the world without any intermediary conceptual framework. The result of this direct link is the nonconceptual content of experience. Second, one has to show that part of the nonconceptual content extracted from the environment correctly represents features of mind independent objects. With regard to the first condition, I have argued elsewhere that a part of visual processing, which I call “perception,” is theory-neutral and nonconceptual. In this paper, facing the second demand, I argue that a part of the nonconceptual content of perception presents properties that are the properties of mind independent objects. I claim first that nonconceptual content is the appropriate level of analysis of the issue of realism since it avoids the main problems besetting various types of analysis of the issue at the level of beliefs about the world. Then I claim that a subset of the nonconceptual content presents features of objects in the environment as they really are.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Psychology, University of Cyprus, P.O. Box 20537, Nicosia, 1678, Cyprus

    Athanasios Raftopoulos

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  1. Athanasios Raftopoulos
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Correspondence to Athanasios Raftopoulos.

Additional information

This paper was mostly written when I was a fellow at the Center of Philosophy of Science in the University of Pittsburgh during the Spring Semester of 2005–2006. A draft of this paper was presented both at the Center’s colloquium and at one of the informal discussion meetings of the fellows. I have very much benefited from the discussion that followed the presentation of the paper and so I would like to thank Gabriele de Anna, Carla Fehr, Malcolm Forster, Lilly Gurova, Nikolay Milkov, and Wang Wei. I am especially indebted to the director of the Center Professor John Norton whose astute comments made me think hard about the issues discussed in the paper. Several of my arguments in Sect. 4 are the result of John’s concerns with the earlier draft of the paper. I would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for helping me clarify several points in the paper. Thanks to them (especially the second one) the paper is considerably better than it would have been without them.

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Raftopoulos, A. Perceptual systems and realism. Synthese 164, 61–91 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9216-3

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