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On what we can ensure

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Abstract

The Conjunction Principle says, roughly, that if the truth of a conjunction can be brought about, then the truth of each conjunct can be brought about. The current essay argues that this principle is not valid. After a clarification of the principle, it is shown how a proper understanding of the involved notions falsify the principle. As a corollary, a recent attack on van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument will be rebutted, because it relies on the invalid conjunction principle.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 6, 20146, Hamburg, Germany

    Benjamin Schnieder

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  1. Benjamin Schnieder
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Correspondence to Benjamin Schnieder.

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Schnieder, B. On what we can ensure. Synthese 162, 101–115 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9175-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9175-8

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