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A New Defence of the Modal Existence Requirement

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Abstract

In this paper, I defend the claim that an object can have a property only if it exists from two arguments, both of which turn on how to understand Plantinga’s notion of the α-transform of a property.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Manitoba, 468 University College, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3T 2M8, Canada

    Ben Caplan

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  1. Ben Caplan
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Correspondence to Ben Caplan.

Additional information

For comments and discussion, thanks to David Sanson and three anonymous referees. For funding in the form of a Standard Research Grant (410-2004-0702), thanks to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).

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Caplan, B. A New Defence of the Modal Existence Requirement. Synthese 154, 335–343 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-3491-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-3491-7

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