The structural view of rational acceptance is a commitment to developing a logical calculus to express rationally accepted propositions sufficient to represent valid argument forms constructed from rationally accepted formulas. This essay argues for this project by observing that a satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox and the paradox of the preface calls for a theory that both (i) offers the facilities to represent accepting less than certain propositions within an interpreted artificial language and (ii) provides a logical calculus of rationally accepted formulas that preserves rational acceptance under consequence. The essay explores the merit and scope of the structural view by observing that some limitations to a recent framework advanced James Hawthorne and Luc Bovens are traced to their framework satisfying the first of these two conditions but not the second.
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Wheeler, G.R. On The Structure of Rational Acceptance: Comments on Hawthorne and Bovens. Synthese 144, 287–304 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-2722-2
- Rational Acceptance
- Artificial Language
- Satisfactory Solution
- Valid Argument
- Argument Form