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Synthese

, Volume 144, Issue 2, pp 287–304 | Cite as

On The Structure of Rational Acceptance: Comments on Hawthorne and Bovens

  • Gregory R. WheelerEmail author
Article

Abstract

The structural view of rational acceptance is a commitment to developing a logical calculus to express rationally accepted propositions sufficient to represent valid argument forms constructed from rationally accepted formulas. This essay argues for this project by observing that a satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox and the paradox of the preface calls for a theory that both (i) offers the facilities to represent accepting less than certain propositions within an interpreted artificial language and (ii) provides a logical calculus of rationally accepted formulas that preserves rational acceptance under consequence. The essay explores the merit and scope of the structural view by observing that some limitations to a recent framework advanced James Hawthorne and Luc Bovens are traced to their framework satisfying the first of these two conditions but not the second.

Keywords

Rational Acceptance Artificial Language Satisfactory Solution Valid Argument Argument Form 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Artificial Intelligence CenterUniversidade Nova de LisboaCaparicaPortugal

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