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Calculi of Epistemic Grounding Based on Prawitz’s Theory of Grounds

Abstract

We define a class of formal systems inspired by Prawitz’s theory of grounds. The latter is a semantics that aims at accounting for epistemic grounding, namely, at explaining why and how deductively valid inferences have the power to epistemically compel to accept the conclusion. Validity is defined in terms of typed objects, called grounds, that reify evidence for given judgments. An inference is valid when a function exists from grounds for the premises to grounds for the conclusion. Grounds are described by formal terms, either directly when the terms are in canonical form, or indirectly when they are in non-canonical form. Non-canonical terms must reduce to canonical form, and two terms may be said to be equal when they converge towards equivalent grounds. In our systems these properties can be proved through rules distinguished according to whether they concern types or logic. Type rules involve type introduction and elimination, equality for application of operational symbols, and re-writing equations for non-canonical terms. The logic amounts to a sort of intuitionistic system in a Gentzen format. To conclude, we show that each system of our class enjoys a normalization property.

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Cesare Cozzo, Gabriella Crocco, Enrico Moriconi and, above all, Dag Prawitz for helpful suggestions. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers, whose comments helped me to improve an earlier draft of this paper.

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Correspondence to Antonio Piccolomini d’Aragona.

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d’Aragona, A.P. Calculi of Epistemic Grounding Based on Prawitz’s Theory of Grounds. Stud Logica 110, 819–877 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-021-09979-6

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Keywords

  • Prawitz
  • Type
  • Grounding
  • Formal system
  • Normalization