Studia Logica

, Volume 105, Issue 2, pp 299–329 | Cite as

Genuine Coherence as Mutual Confirmation Between Content Elements

  • Michael Schippers
  • Gerhard Schurz


The concepts of coherence and confirmation are closely intertwined: according to a prominent proposal coherence is nothing but mutual confirmation. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that both are confronted with similar problems. As regards Bayesian confirmation measures these are illustrated by the problem of tacking by conjunction. On the other hand, Bayesian coherence measures face the problem of belief individuation. In this paper we want to outline the benefit of an approach to coherence and confirmation based on content elements. It will be shown that the resulting concepts, called genuine coherence and genuine confirmation, can be used in order to solve the two mentioned problems. In a final section we present some results on degrees of genuine coherence and genuine confirmation.


(Probabilistic measures of) coherence (Probabilistic measures of) confirmation Problem of belief individuation Tacking problem Content elements 


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCarl von Ossietzky University of OldenburgOldenburgGermany
  2. 2.Department of Philosophy, Düsseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceHeinrich Heine University DuesseldorfDuesseldorfGermany

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