Abstract
I develop a dynamic logic for reasoning about “interrogative belief revision”, a new branch of belief revision theory that has been developed in a small number of papers, beginning with E. J. Olsson and D. Westlund’s paper “On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change” [12]. In interrogative belief revision, epistemic states are taken to include a research agenda, consisting of questions the agent seeks to answer. I present a logic for revision of such epistemic states based on the notion of an epistemic strategy, a stable plan of action that determines changes in the agent’s research agenda. This idea is a further development of an idea put forward in [6], that changes in the research agenda of an agent should be determined by stable, “long term” research interests. I provide complete axioms and a decidability result for the logic.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Blackburn, P., M. de Rijke, and Y. Venema, Modal Logic, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Baltag, A., L. S. Moss and S. Solecki, The logic of common knowledge, public announcements and private suspicions, in I. Gilboa (ed.), Proceedings of the 7th Conference on Theoretical aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 98), 1998, pp. 43–56.
Bonanno G.: A simple modal logic for belief revision. Synthese 147, 193–228 (2005)
Board O.: Dynamic interactive epistemology. Games and Economic Behavior 49, 49–80 (2004)
Enqvist S.: Interrogative belief revision in modal logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38, 527–548 (2009)
Enqvist S.: Contraction in interrogative belief revision. Erkenntnis 72, 315–335 (2010)
Genot E.: The Game of Inquiry: the interrogative approach to inquiry and belief revision theory. Synthese 171, 271–289 (2009)
Gárdenfors P.: Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the dynamics of epistemic states. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1988)
Hintikka J.: Inquiry as Inquiry: A Logic of Scientific Discovery. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht (1999)
Hughes, G.E. and M.J. Cresswell, A New Introduction to Modal Logic, Routledge, 1996.
Lewis, D., Counterfactuals, Harvard University Press 1973.
Olsson E.J., Westlund D.: On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change. Erkenntnis 65, 165–183 (2006)
Osborne, M. J., and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, The MIT Press, 1994.
Rosencrantz H.: Properties of goal systems: consistency, conflict and coherence. Studia Logica 89, 37–58 (2008)
Rott, H., Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-seven Iterated Theory Change Operators, in D. Makinson, J. Malinowski and H. Wansing (eds.), Towards Mathematical Philosophy, Trends in Logic 28, Springer 2009, pp. 269–296.
Segerberg K.: Irrevocable belief revision in dynamic doxastic logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 39, 287–306 (1998)
Segerberg K., Leitgeb H.: Dynamic doxastic logic—why, how and where to?. Synthese 155, 167–190 (2007)
Stalnaker R.: Iterated belief revision. Erkenntnis 70, 189–209 (2009)
van Benthem J.: Dynamic logic for belief revision. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17, 129–155 (2007)
van Benthem J., Minica S.: Toward a Dynamic Logic of Questions. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5834, 27–41 (2009)
van Ditmarsch H.P., van der Hoek P., Kooi B.P.: Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Springer, Dordrecht (2005)
Wisniewski A.: Erotetic arguments: A Preliminary Analysis. Studia Logica 50, 261–274 (1991)
Wisniewski A.: Erotetic Implications. Journal of Philosophical Logic 23, 173–195 (1994)
Wisniewski A.: The Logic of Questions as a Theory of Erotetic Arguments. Synthese 109, 1–25 (1996)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Enqvist, S. Interrogative Belief Revision Based on Epistemic Strategies. Stud Logica 100, 453–479 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-012-9410-2
Received:
Revised:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-012-9410-2