Studia Logica

, Volume 100, Issue 3, pp 453–479 | Cite as

Interrogative Belief Revision Based on Epistemic Strategies

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Abstract

I develop a dynamic logic for reasoning about “interrogative belief revision”, a new branch of belief revision theory that has been developed in a small number of papers, beginning with E. J. Olsson and D. Westlund’s paper “On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change” [12]. In interrogative belief revision, epistemic states are taken to include a research agenda, consisting of questions the agent seeks to answer. I present a logic for revision of such epistemic states based on the notion of an epistemic strategy, a stable plan of action that determines changes in the agent’s research agenda. This idea is a further development of an idea put forward in [6], that changes in the research agenda of an agent should be determined by stable, “long term” research interests. I provide complete axioms and a decidability result for the logic.

Keywords

Belief revision Research agenda Dynamic logic Questions 

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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyLund UniversityLundSweden

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