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Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem

Studia Logica volume 89, pages 333–341 (2008)Cite this article

Abstract

We discuss two objections that foundationalists have raised against infinite chains of probabilistic justification. We demonstrate that neither of the objections can be maintained.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Oude Boteringestraat 52, 9712 GL, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson

Authors
  1. Jeanne Peijnenburg
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  2. David Atkinson
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Correspondence to Jeanne Peijnenburg.

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Peijnenburg, J., Atkinson, D. Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem. Stud Logica 89, 333–341 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-008-9132-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-008-9132-7

Keywords

  • Probabilistic justification
  • regress problem
  • foundationalism
  • infinitism