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Enlightenment, reason and universalism: Kant’s Critical Insights

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Abstract

‘Universalist’ moral principles have fallen into disfavour because too often they have been pretexts for unilateral impositions upon others, whether domestically or internationally. Too widely neglected has been Kant’s specifically Critical re-analysis of the scope and character of rational justification in all non-formal domains, including the entirety of epistemology and moral philosophy, including both justice and ethics. Rational judgment is inherently normative because it is in part constituted by our self-assessment of whether the considerations we now integrate into a candidate judgment have been integrated as they ought, so as to form a cogent, justifiable judgment. Constitutive of this self-assessment is that rational judgments must be based upon considerations which can be communicated to all others, such that they too can assess them as sufficiently cogent justification; also constitutive of this rational self-assessment is that we actually engage with others who do assess our judgments. Kant’s Critical principles rule out in principle any unilateral imposition upon others, whether in cognition or morals. Using Kant’s Critical principles and methods in connection with ‘practical anthropology’ and the enormously important domain of acquired rights and obligations shows how Kant had already justified fundamentally universal principles of justice which can be institutionalised in variously distinctive cultures, and which form the proper bases for our acquired, specifically social rights and obligations, including those of friendship and community.

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Notes

  1. An example of factional loyalty masquerading as methodological purity is the long and heated debate about ‘methodological individualism’, which too often served as a banner under which to promote substantive individualism; see Westphal (2003), §§32–37, (2013d).

  2. Einstein (2000), 314. Ockham’s principle of explanatory parsimony is a methodological principle for choosing between two otherwise equally adequate scientific theories, a rare coincidence. Quine, however, insists on ontological parsimony—this is his (1969, 134) ‘preference’ for ontological ‘desert landscapes’—in advance of philosophical analysis, though to the detriment of his own semantics; see Westphal (2015), §§4–5.

  3. Kant’s works are cited by the initials of their German titles, and by volume:page numbers of Kant (1902, 2009); the abbreviations used are listed in the References.

  4. The views and analyses I ascribe to Kant may not be familiar, nor obvious. The present analysis is based on my (2016a), and is corroborated and extended by my (2016c).

  5. My claim is comparative; Kant has much of value to say about moral education: see Herman (2007), 106–53.

  6. These same revisions to Kant’s practical anthropology were made by Hegel; see Westphal (1991, 2005, 2013b, 2016d, e).

  7. Hume (2000), cited as ‘T’ by Book.Part.§.¶ numbers.

  8. See Haakonssen (1981), (1993), (1996), chapter 3, and Buckle (1991).

  9. ‘… if by natural we understand what is common to any species, or even if we confine it to mean what is inseparable from the species’ (T 3.2.1.19).

  10. Relative scarcity of goods: T 3.2.2, ¶¶7, 16, 18; their easy transfer: T 3.2..2, ¶¶7, 16; our limited generosity: T 3.2..2.16, 3.2.5.8, 3.3.3.24; natural ignorance of possession: T 3.2.2.11, 3.4.2.2, 3.2.6.3–4; limited powers and consequent mutual interdependence: T 3.2.2.2–3.

  11. Rousseau (1762), (1976), Book 1, chapters 6 (¶1) and 8 (¶2); see Westphal (2013a).

  12. O’Neill (2000a), 200; cf. Westphal (1997), §§4, 5.

  13. O’Neill (1989), 81–125. A maxim such as one by which you and I agree now that ‘I shall exploit you at one time and you me at another’ may satisfy minimal requirements on the generality of reasons for action (namely, that a reason for one agent can also be a reason for others), but such examples only underscore that such generality does not suffice for Kant’s specific universality requirement, which expressly rules out making an exception for oneself from an otherwise universal rule (GMS 4:424, 440 note, MdS 6:321).

  14. Those who think moral justification can dispense with this condition ought carefully to rethink the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion; see Westphal (2014a).

  15. This paragraph summarises some thoughts from O’Neill (2000a); cf. O’Neill (1996, 2000b, 2003, 2004a, b), Westphal (2014a). The embeddedness of equal respect for all persons as free rational agents within Kant’s universalisation tests shows that the incommensurable worth or ‘dignity’ of free rational agency (GMS 4:434–5) is not required as an independent premiss in Kant’s analysis, nor specifically as a premiss regarding value. This is not to reject Kant’s account of dignity, but it is to dispatch as irrelevant debate about whether there are any incommensurable values.

  16. Regarding some key shortcomings in consent theories, see O’Neill (2000a), 185–91; Westphal (2014b).

  17. This is precisely the point reached by the two, originally starkly individualist moral judges Hegel analyses in ‘Evil and Forgiveness’ (PhdG, chapter VICc), which is expressly the first instance of genuine mutual recognition in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (GW 9:359.9–23, 360.31–361.4, .22–25, 362.21–29/¶¶666, 669, 670, 671), and which constitutes the advent of ‘absolute spirit’ (GW 9:361.22–25/¶670); see Westphal (2009, 2014a). I have not ‘hegelised’ Kant (see below section “Reason, justification and critique”); to the contrary, Hegel recognised the full scope and significance of Kant’s Transcendental Doctrine of Method and his critique of judgment, in all three Critiques, and made it central to his further development of Kant’s moral principles in his own Philosophical Outlines of Justice; see Westphal (2016d, e, f).

  18. This is built into Hegel’s concept of ‘determinate negation’ (PhdG, GW 9:57.1–12/¶79); see Westphal (1989), 125–6, 135–6, 163. By ‘possible’ alternatives here I do not mean mere logical possibilities, but cogent alternatives which heretofore lacked proponents. In non-formal domains, mere logical possibilities have no justificatory status; this they only gain through relevant evidence; see Westphal (2010/11).

  19. Watson (1881) remains instructive.

  20. For discussion, see Beiser (1987), 16–164.

  21. Cinzia Ferrini reminded me of Kant’s essay and its relevance. Allen Wood’s translation (Kant 1998, 3–14) is very good, and is used here with only minor revisions.

  22. Wood (2014, 65–9) neglects these fundamentally intersubjective, social aspects of Kant’s constructivist account of rational justification in non-formal domains.

  23. Kant’s note concludes by remarking: ‘Thus it is quite easy to ground enlightenment in individual subjects through their education; one must only begin early to accustom young minds to this reflection. But to enlighten an age is very slow and arduous; for there are external obstacles which in part forbid this manner of education and in part make it more difficult’. Indeed so! Our commercially driven media-marketing societies are obstructing ever more forcefully and thoroughly the aims, means and provisions of enlightened education and responsible, informed social participation.

  24. E.g., Toulmin (1953), Baier (1958), Singer (1961), Nielsen (1989).

  25. This is a version of the basic question posed by Gauthier’s radical contractarianism; I examine it in Westphal (2016a), §§29–34.

  26. I have presented only the necessary minimum of Kant’s Critical methodology, to keep my discussion as exoteric as possible. For more complete analysis and defence, see Westphal (2014a), (2016b).

  27. Kant primarily formulates ‘respect’ as respect for the moral law (GMS 4:400, 401n, 403, 424, 426, 436, 440, KdpV 5:73, 74–6, 78–86, 128, 132, 151, 157). Respect for the moral law is constituted by recognising the Categorical Imperative as the fundamental moral principle and to follow what the Categorical Imperative requires because it is the fundamental principle of morals. Kant’s Categorical Imperative is the fundamental principle of morals because it provides the fundamental criterial procedure for distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate types of action by distinguishing between prohibited, permissible, and obligatory types of action. To use Kant’s Categorical Imperative and to follow its dictates thus requires using the constructivist method explicated here for identifying and justifying legitimate maxims. Kant is emphatic that only insofar as we use the Categorical Imperative and follow its dictates can and do we treat each and every person as an end in him- or herself, and not merely as a means. Doing this requires that we think and act only on the basis of justifiable, and indeed rationally justified principles. A necessary and sufficient criterion of rationally justifiable or justified principles is that only for such principles can we offer all concerned parties sufficient justifying reasons to think or act as we do or propose to do.

    Kant also speaks of respect for persons, not just for the moral law; this is central to his formulation of the Humanity Imperative (GMS 4:429). Hence on Kant’s view it is proper to speak of respect for persons, although human beings merit respect as persons only due to their ‘personality’ (KdpV 5:87), which is their capacity to perform their duties by using and following the dictates of the Categorical Imperative: ‘All respect for a person is actually only respect for the [moral] law (of moral integrity, etc.), of which the person provides us the example’ (GMS 4:401 note, cf. 4:428, 435, 436, 439, 440, KdpV 5:87, 93).

  28. On pertinent philosophy of education, see Green (1999), Curren (2000), (2010), Westphal (2012).

  29. Cf. Hegel, Rph §3 Remark; for discussion, see Westphal (2010, 2013b).

  30. Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, §§8.1.7, 11.20; Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, §§2.1.5, 3.2.27, 5.2.28 (both in: Hume 1975).

  31. E.g., Blum (1980), (1993), Friedman (1989), (1993), Stocker (1976), (1981); for a résumé, see Helm (2009), §3. The problems they identify regarding impartiality pertain to ‘Moral Point of View’ theories or to classical utilitarianism, though not to Kant’s moral philosophy.

  32. See Westphal (2016a), §41, (2016c).

  33. Drafts of this paper were presented to the Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University (Kraków, April 2015), to the Department of Philosophy, Orta Doğu Tenkik Üniversitesi (Ankara, March 2016) and to the conference, ‘Kant’s Conception of Moral Evil’, Keele University (March 2016). I am grateful to each of the organisers—Justyna Miklaszewska, Aziz F. Zambak and Sorin Baiasu, respectively—for their kind invitations, and to the audiences for their very fruitful discussion. I am honoured and very happy to dedicate this essay to Nelly Motroshilova, außerordentliche Aufklärerin!

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    Kenneth R. Westphal

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Westphal, K.R. Enlightenment, reason and universalism: Kant’s Critical Insights . Stud East Eur Thought 68, 127–148 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-016-9259-4

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