Connections (and Limits) Between Law and Natural Sciences: The Concepts of Causality and Culpability from the Perspective of Criminal Law

Abstract

In order to establish criminal responsibility, criminal law theory uses categories summed up in words or expressions commonly used in other fields, namely scientific and philosophical knowledge. A clear example can be found in the concepts of cause and freedom/culpability, which are used in the theory of crime as a fundamental basis for the attribution of a criminal event. The possibility of knowing and predicting phenomena provides man with the ability to exercise control over an event and to be liable for its results. The different “uses” and “meanings” of these categories in the fields of law and in natural sciences lie at the centre of the issues examined here. The uncertainty surrounding causality has become undeniably relevant within the natural sciences. Simultaneously, the neurosciences have recently addressed and questioned the meaning of free will and culpability. This article argues that the contribution made by the natural sciences to the theoretical legal system, mainly with regard to the categories of causality and culpability, must be considered with care, seeking to demonstrate that scientific developments do not necessarily undermine these legal concepts, but enable them to be improved.