Petrovich provides an insightful study on analytic philosophy (AP) with the intention of determining whether this sub-field of philosophy has been operating within what Kuhn calls a normal science framework. Through a citation analysis, Petrovich concludes that AP does not exhibit the sort of pattern that we would expect of a field operating in a normal science phase. I take issue with Petrovich’s way of measuring normal science. I provide some insight into how we might better measure normal science in future studies.
KeywordsNormal science Citation analysis Thomas Kuhn Analytic philosophy Scientific fields
Research on this paper was supported by a Grant from Aarhus Universitets Forskningsfond (AUFF-E-2017-FLS-7-3). It is part of a project on the Epistemological Dimensions of Scientific Publication.
- Kuhn, T. S. (1962/2012). Structure of scientific revolutions (4th ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar