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Scientometrics

, Volume 117, Issue 1, pp 647–650 | Cite as

A note on measuring normal science

  • K. Brad Wray
Article

Abstract

Petrovich provides an insightful study on analytic philosophy (AP) with the intention of determining whether this sub-field of philosophy has been operating within what Kuhn calls a normal science framework. Through a citation analysis, Petrovich concludes that AP does not exhibit the sort of pattern that we would expect of a field operating in a normal science phase. I take issue with Petrovich’s way of measuring normal science. I provide some insight into how we might better measure normal science in future studies.

Keywords

Normal science Citation analysis Thomas Kuhn Analytic philosophy Scientific fields 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Research on this paper was supported by a Grant from Aarhus Universitets Forskningsfond (AUFF-E-2017-FLS-7-3). It is part of a project on the Epistemological Dimensions of Scientific Publication.

References

  1. Kuhn, T. S. (1962/2012). Structure of scientific revolutions (4th ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  2. Petrovich, E. (2018). Accumulation of knowledge in para-scientific areas: The case of analytic philosophy. Scientometrics.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-018-2796-5. (forthcoming).Google Scholar
  3. Pravdić, N., & Pekorari, R. (1985). The citing practices of the authors to the national journals in mathematics, physics, and chemistry. Scientometrics, 8(3–4), 233–246.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Wray, K. B. (2016). No new evidence for a citation benefit for author-pay open access publications in the social sciences and humanities. Scientometrics, 106(3), 1031–1035.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, Hungary 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Science Studies, Department of MathematicsAarhus UniversityAarhusDenmark

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