Small Business Economics

, Volume 48, Issue 1, pp 71–97 | Cite as

Experience and gender effects in acquisition experiment with value messages

  • D. Di CagnoEmail author
  • A. Galliera
  • W. Güth
  • N. Pace
  • L. Panaccione


In the bargaining experiment, the privately informed seller of a company sends a value message to the uninformed potential buyer who proposes a price for acquiring the company. Participants are constantly either seller or buyer and interact over 30 rounds with randomly changing partners. How are overstating the value of the company, underpricing the received value message and acceptance of price offers affected by experience and gender (constellation)? We control via treatments for awareness of gender (constellation) and show that gender (constellation) matters and that the main experience effects apply across gender (constellations).


Bargaining Price signals Learning Experiment Gender Winner’s curse Take-over bidding 

JEL Classifications

C78 C91 D83 J16 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • D. Di Cagno
    • 1
    Email author
  • A. Galliera
    • 1
  • W. Güth
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  • N. Pace
    • 4
  • L. Panaccione
    • 5
  1. 1.Luiss Guido CarliRomeItaly
  2. 2.Frankfurt School of Finance and ManagementFrankfurt am MainGermany
  3. 3.Max Planck Institute on Collective GoodsBonnGermany
  4. 4.University Ca’ Foscari of VeniceVeniceItaly
  5. 5.University of Rome Tor VergataRomeItaly

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